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Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the
Conflict Between Current and Future
Investors
Steven L. Schwarczt
The fundamental goal of securities law is to make markets
more efficient by providing transparency to investors, thereby
reducing asymmetric information.1 The fundamental goal of
corporation law is to cause managers to govern for the benefit
of the firm and its investors. 2 The fundamental goal of credit
t Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School
of Law; Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center. E-mail:
schwarcz@law.duke.edu. The author thanks Neil Andrews, Gregor Bachmann,
Brian R. Cheffins, James D. Cox, Lawrence Darby, Deborah A. DeMott, Jill E.
Fisch, Francisco Garcimartin, Thomas Lee Hazen, Jennifer Hill, Kon Sik Kim,
Troy A. Paredes, Daniel B. Schwarcz, Eric T. Spink, and participants in fac-
ulty workshops at The University of Melbourne Law School, Monash Univer-
sity Law School, and Victoria University Faculty of Business & Law (Centre
for International Corporate Governance Research) for helpful comments, and
Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Richard Griffin, Nic Merrin, Mackenzie B. Morse, Jesse
H. Rigsby, IV, Paul M. Schoenhard, and Robert Louis Stevenson for excellent
research assistance. Copyright © 2005 by Steven L. Schwarcz.
1. Matthew F. Gorra, On-Line Trading and United States Securities Pol-
icy: Evaluating the SEC's Role in International Securities Regulation, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209, 210 n.4 (1998) (noting that "[b]y imposing anti-fraud
and disclosure requirements. .. , the Commission preserves marketwide
transparency and, hence, fosters efficient domestic securities markets"); Mar-
cel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices,
1992 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (observing that "[tlhe compliance effort is rational-
ized, to a significant degree, by one principal goal of securities laws: to create
stock markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its funda-
mental value"); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges
and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 17, 31 (1999) (arguing that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) "has long believed that transparency ... plays a fundamental
role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets . . and improves
the price discovery, fairness, competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. mar-
kets").
2. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1326
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rating agencies is to provide ratings that accurately inform in-
vestors of the likelihood of timely payment on a firm's bonds.
This Article argues that these goals are, at best, imperfectly
achieved because of the conflict between current and future in-
vestors3 (hereinafter, the "temporal conflict" 4), and the different
perspectives that conflict creates-not only confusing the inves-
tor audience within each of these areas of law, but also creating
inconsistent obligations to investors across these areas. An un-
derstanding of the temporal conflict also reveals that wide-
spread perceptions of corporate wrongdoing can be misleading
where corporate actions taken ex ante to benefit one investor
group inadvertently harm another investor group ex post.
5
This Article's purpose is both positive and normative: to
explain the temporal conflict and its attendant problems, and
to help resolve the conflict by analyzing, in each case, who
should be included in the relevant audience. Because my analy-
sis focuses on the inherently clashing perspectives of current
and future investors, 6 it is fundamentally different from the fo-
(1992) (observing that "the fundamental goal of corporate law is so theoreti-
cally and historically obvious that it need not be explicated: the goal is to
maximize corporate-and thus shareholder-welfare").
3. "Current investors" of a firm at any given time are those who, at such
time, hold securities of the firm. "Future investors" of a firm at any given time
are those who do not, at such time-but who do at a later time-hold securi-
ties of the firm. For example, if at a given time Investor X holds securities of
Firm Y, Investor X would be a current investor at that time in Firm Y. Simi-
larly, if at a given time Investor W holds no securities of Firm Y but later
holds securities of Firm Y, Investor W would be a future investor at that time
in Firm Y The term "future investors" thus includes only those who in fact
later invest in securities of the firm at issue, and does not include those who
may later invest but do not in fact do so, no matter how likely that later in-
vestment was.
The temporal conflict is not between types of investors per se, but between
current and future investors of any given type. Examples include the conflict
between current and future shareholders, or between current and future
bondholders.
4. Although this Article uses the term "temporal conflict," the conflict
also could be described as "inter-temporal" or "intertemporal." Cf. Henry T.C.
Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and
the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (1991) (charac-
terizing this conflict as one of "pronounced intertemporal dimensions").
5. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
6. The actual identity of the current and future investors is irrelevant to
my analysis of the temporal conflict so long as-as would be expected-there
are at least some current investors and future investors who are different at
any given point in time. The fact that future investors eventually become cur-
rent investors is thus not determinative. See infra note 59. Similarly, the type
of investors to whom directors are obligated (e.g., shareholders, creditors) is
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cus of existing scholarship, which examines second-order dis-
tinctions resulting from the conflicting goals of current long-
and short-term investors. 7 That is a more tractable conflict be-
cause the investor audience is known. In contrast, few courts or
commentators have ever grappled with the temporal conflict,
making it virtually an issue of first impression.8
This Article ultimately argues for a second-best solution to
the temporal conflict: proposing that firms should err against
disclosure in cases of ambiguity. This solution, I show, would be
less costly to investors, issuers, and markets than existing dis-
closure strategies. This solution also could help resolve the
broader debate over how to minimize the ambiguity of disclo-
sure in securities law. 9
INTRODUCTION
To understand the temporal conflict, consider the dilemma
of disclosure. By disclosing risks, a firm's management reduces,
and ideally eliminates, the information asymmetry between the
firm and investors in the firm's securities. There is little ques-
tion that a clear and credible risk must be disclosed.10 Disclo-
sure, however, involves probabilities and difficult judgment
choices, and often is ambiguous (hereinafter "disclosure ambi-
guity"):
irrelevant to my analysis, which focuses on the temporal conflict between cur-
rent and future investors of any given type. See supra note 3.
7. For a detailed discussion of how these conflicts differ, see infra notes
55-58 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part I (Relevant Legal Precedents). I have discussed the
temporal conflict with several top securities law professors and regulators,
and-even though they agree this is an interesting and important issue-they
are not aware of any other precedent. See, e.g., Letter from Eric T. Spink, Ca-
nadian Barrister and Solicitor and former Vice-Chair, Alberta [Canada] Secu-
rities Commission, to the author 3 (June 28, 2004) (on file with the Minnesota
Law Review) (observing that "I am not aware of any scholarly review of the
'conflict' between current and future investors but I can attest to the fact that
it was already a long-standing issue in Canada in 1988 (when I first encoun-
tered it)"). I will pay a $100 reward to anyone finding a significant precedent
that might have been missed in this research! For conjecture on why there are
so few precedents, see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (explaining
that low historical turnover levels in holdings of securities reduced the tempo-
ral conflict's significance, whereas recent financial innovation has dramati-
cally increased turnover levels and thus the conflict's significance).
9. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
10. I later discuss when the duty to disclose arises, and conclude that the
timing of disclosure is neutral to this Article's analysis. See infra note 16.
1046 [89:1044
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Many pages of judicial and scholarly ink have been spent assessing
the conceptual or contextual importance or significance of a wide va-
riety of facts and events, the nature of a "reasonable shareholder" or
"reasonable investor," and the composition of a "total mix" of informa-
tion, among other things, in order to determine whether a particular
fact is or was required to be disclosed. Unfortunately, however, appli-
cable decisional law and scholarship often do not permit a definitive
determination as to the materiality of facts or events, even if recur-
ring. 1
If a risk is possible though unlikely, should management
disclose it?12 If the risk should be disclosed, how prominently
11. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of In-
sider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1152-53 (2003) (ob-
serving also that the materiality standard's "interpretation and application
(both as a general matter and in specific factual scenarios) often are not
clear"); see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)
("[T]he determination of materiality [and thus the obligation to disclose] ...
requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder'
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to
him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact."); Hemin-
way, supra, at 1149 ("[T]he law addresses only two options-'material' and
'not material.' Unfortunately, application of the current standard for determin-
ing materiality frequently yields a third result-'possibly material.'. . . If only
materiality were as precise a sorting device as the [Harry Potteresque] Hog-
warts Sorting Hat .... ); E-mail from Thomas Lee Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina (at Chapel Hill), to the author
1 (Mar. 28, 2004) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (observing that "the
cases are all over the place regarding materiality and soft information").
12. Federal securities law in the United States generally attempts to ad-
dress this problem by requiring disclosure of risk through a probability-
magnitude approach, according to which the materiality of a contingent or
speculative event would depend on balancing the probability of the event oc-
curring and the anticipated magnitude of the event's impact on the condition
of the firm. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)). If the resulting fac-
tor is small, theoretically the market will disregard the risk or minimally dis-
count the securities. The temporal conflict would be interesting but not neces-
sarily problematic in the United States if firms were precisely able to gage the
probability and magnitude of risks and investors were able to disregard or dis-
count disclosed risks in a perfectly rational manner. The former is not realistic
and, as this Article will discuss, investors are rarely so rational. See infra
notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing behavioral psychology). Note
also that a firm's Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosure,
discussed infra note 28, is subject to a slightly different disclosure standard.
See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Re-
sults of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989) (clarify-
ing that the MD&A "mandates disclosure of specified forward-looking informa-
tion, and specifies its own standard for disclosure-i.e., reasonably likely to
have a material effect"). Professors Donald C. Langevoort and Troy A. Paredes
suggest that this different MD&A standard "reflects concern that using mate-
riality as the threshold for an affirmative obligation to disclose forward-
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should it be disclosed?13 These questions raise an inherent di-
lemma: disclosure of a possible risk harms a firm's current in-
vestors, and the more prominent the disclosure, the greater
their harm.14 On the other hand, failure to disclose the risk, or
to give sufficient prominence to the disclosure, may harm the
firm's future investors.15 On which audience should disclosure
be focused?16
looking information would encourage excessive disclosure." Troy A. Paredes,
Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securi-
ties Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 449 (2003) (referring to Donald C.
Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced
Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 775 (1997)).
13. For example, for disclosure on the firm's financial statements, should
the risk be disclosed as a liability or merely in the footnotes to the financial
statements as a contingency? Cf. infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text(discussing that question in connection with the adequacy of Enron's disclo-
sure).
14. Although disclosure alerts current investors to the possibility of opting
out of their investment based on the risk disclosed, a decision to opt out is aslikely to be wrong as right where there is disclosure ambiguity. Moreover,
even where opting out is the right decision, those investors still would be
harmed to the extent the disclosure reduces the sales price of their securities
before they have the chance to sell. Although some investors, such as day
traders, might be able to sell before the price drops, most of a firm's currentinvestors will not. See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price
Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47
STAN. L. REv. 7, 21 (1994) (stating that prices of "widely held and heavily
traded securities" appear to "promptly incorporate relevant public informa-
tion"). One reviewer of this Article nonetheless argues that "that price reduc-
tion will be moderated by the possibility that the risk will ultimately pass
without negatively affecting the issuer [whereas] [i]f the ambiguous risk is not
disclosed until it becomes more obviously material, the price reduction or
'harm' will be greater and more surprising." Letter from Eric T. Spink to au-
thor, supra note 8, at 1. Ultimate passing of the risk will not, however, lessen
the harm to those current investors who sell their securities after the price
drops but before the risk passes. Furthermore, in cases where the ambiguous
risk later becomes "more obviously material," there is no basis to believe, as
former Vice-Chairman Spink contends, that the price reduction absent earlier
ambiguous disclosure will be greater than the price reduction with such dis-
closure: the latter necessarily must take into account both the price reduction
caused by the ambiguous disclosure and the additional price reduction caused
by later disclosure that the once-ambiguous risk is now more obviously mate-
rial.
15. And the less prominent the disclosure, the greater the potential harm
to those investors.
16. This Article previously indicated, supra note 3, that current investors
of a firm are those who, at any given time, hold securities of the firm, whilefuture investors of a firm are those who do not, at such time-but who do at alater time-hold securities of the firm. Because, as discussed in the text above,
the consequences of the temporal conflict are most pronounced in the disclo-
sure context, the relevant time is likely to be a time that disclosure is legally
2005] TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES 1049
Corporation law suggests the audience should be current
investors. Directors and management, at least in the United
States, have a fiduciary duty only to investors holding an exist-
ing property right or equitable interest to support such a
duty-i.e., current investors. 17 Presumably, then, in case of
doubt, management should err on the side of less prominent
disclosure of risk because that helps current investors preserve
the value of their investments.18
Management, however, also must comply with securities
law. In theory, securities law appears less explicitly cognizant
of temporal distinctions and mostly concerned with disclosure
for the sake of market efficiency, to be achieved through full
disclosure of material information which, in turn, would allow
required. Under the securities law of the United States, there is no general
ongoing duty to disclose material information. MARC I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 287 (3d ed. 2001) (noting "there currently is
no general affirmative duty to disclose even material information regarding
the issuer except in certain specific circumstances"). An issuer has a duty to
disclose all material information at the time of issuing securities, and also at
the time of filing each of its quarterly and annual periodic reports. Id. at 286-
87. The issuer also may have a continuous ongoing duty to update a previously
made statement that has become materially false or misleading as a result of
subsequent events. Id. at 285. In other legal systems, such as Australia, there
may be a continuous ongoing duty to disclose material information. See AUS-
TRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE, CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE: THE AUSTRALIAN
EXPERIENCE 5 (Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/pdf/con
tinuousdisclosure-theaustexperience.pdf (stating that ASX Listing Rule 3.1
requires companies to disclose information that a reasonable person would ex-
pect would have a material effect on the price or value of the corporation's se-
curities). The fact that different legal systems may require disclosure at differ-
ent times, however, is neutral to my analysis.
17. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (citing Anadarko
Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988)). But cf.
Gaiman v. Nat'l Ass'n for Mental Health, 3 W.L.R. 42, 54 (Ch. 1970) (holding,
as a matter of U.K. company law, that management has a fiduciary duty to
"both present and future members [i.e., shareholders]").
18. Several reviewers observed that, for some current investors--
specifically shareholders and others with rights and powers regarding corpo-
rate governance-disclosure would not have an exclusively negative affect on
the value of their investments. It also might positively affect that value by in-
creasing their ability to make informed use of governance powers (e.g., inform-
ing their decision whether to retain or replace the firm's current directors) and
this increased value should be offset against any negative impact of disclosure.
My analysis does not provide for this offset, however, because for the type of
disclosure at issue in this Article-that for which there is disclosure ambigu-
ity-disclosing would not facilitate, and indeed may well impede, informed use
of governance powers. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (arguing
that making this type of disclosure may well decrease transparency).
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investors to make informed decisions. 19 In practice, though, se-
curities law in the United States requires disclosure in two con-
texts, each of which raises the temporal conflict. The first con-
text is the disclosure required in connection with the issuance
of securities, usually in the form of a prospectus and associated
registration statement.20 The second context is periodic report-
ing.21
Disclosure required in connection with the issuance of se-
curities is intended to inform investors considering buying
those securities. Therefore, the primary investor audience
would appear to be future investors. 22 This disclosure focuses
on warning those investors of all possible material risks associ-
ated with the securities.23 The temporal conflict arises because
such disclosure could hurt current investors.
The temporal conflict also arises in the context of periodic
reporting. Although the disclosure here appears to be intended
for the benefit of all investors, 24 current and future, 25 disclosure
19. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 9 (1981); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984) (arguing
that the various sources of securities law are structured around the efficient
capital market hypothesis).
20. See Richard J. Morgan, Application of the Securities Laws in Chapter
11 Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1983 U. ILL. L.
REV. 861, 892 (stating that the first step in protecting investors through ade-
quate disclosure is the requirement of a prospectus and registration state-
ment); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77b(10), 77f, 77g (2000).
21. Section 13 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter '34
Act] requires periodic reporting, which in practice is most often provided
through SEC-required forms 10-K for annual, 10-Q for quarterly, and 8-K for
defined-event reports. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West Supp. 2002). Although § 13 is
the primary source of periodic reporting, other reporting requirements are set
forth in Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2004); the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.); and relevant state law.
22. This appears to be the theory of the SEC's exchange decisions, dis-
cussed infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 845, 850 (D. Utah
1995) ("The purpose of Rule 10b-5's 'omission of a material fact' language is to
allow plaintiffs to sue companies that fail to disclose risks to potential inves-
tors."), aff'd, 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997).
24. Periodic reporting has three statutorily stated goals: protection of in-
vestors, protection of the public interest, and ensuring fair dealing in securi-
ties. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000) (requiring "[e]very issuer of a security
registered pursuant to section 781 to file with the Commission, in accordance
with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair
dealing in the security") (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(l) (West Supp.
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law, at least in the United States, implicitly allows firms to fa-
vor the interests of one such group of investors over another.
Firms are afforded leeway with the timing of the required peri-
odic reporting, 26 for example, and have the option to disclose
"soft information"27 that is not required. 28 Thus, any such dis-
closure (or lack of disclosure) can be phrased or timed in a
manner that benefits one audience over the other. As a result,
agency costs may bias this disclosure because the independent
attorneys and underwriters who help prepare disclosure in the
securities "issuance" context are usually not involved; instead,
periodic reports are generally prepared by management and
2004) (requiring "[e]ach issuer reporting under subsection (a) of this section or
section 78o(d) [to] disclose to the public... such additional information ... as
the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of
investors and in the public interest") (emphasis added); see also Linda Yi, Road
Shows on the Internet: Taking Individual Investors for a Ride on the Informa-
tion Highway, 52 DUKE L.J. 243, 243 (2002) (noting that the SEC has adopted
similar goals of protecting investors and promoting market efficiency).
25. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 1997) ("A
statement or omission is only material if a reasonable investor would consider
it important in determining whether to buy or sell stock.") (emphasis added).
26. See D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC's New Regula-
tion FD and its Impact on Market Participants, 77 IND. L.J. 551, 552-53
(2002) (arguing that the '34 Act does not require a firm to disclose all material
events as soon as they occur, therefore allowing firms some control over the
precise timing of important corporate disclosures); see also Timely Disclosure
of Material Corporate Developments, Exchange Act Releases Nos. 33-5092, 34-
8995, IC-6209, 35 FED. REG. 16,733 (Oct. 29, 1970); Harvey L. Pitt, Speech by
SEC Chairman: Fall Meeting of the ABA's Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities (Nov. 16, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch524.htm) (discussing the SEC's intention in periodic reporting to
"permit an appropriate amount of flexibility in deciding what to disclose im-
mediately, and what can be deferred").
27. "Soft" information includes predictions and matters of opinion, as op-
posed to "hard" information which "is typically historical information or other
factual information that is objectively verifiable." Garcia v. Cordova, 930 F.2d
826, 830 (10th Cir. 1991); see In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394,
402 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no duty to disclose soft information
unless such information is virtually as certain as hard information). Differen-
tiating hard from soft information may not, however, always be a straightfor-
ward task. See Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience:
Will It Be Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28
J. CORP. L. 69, 92 (2002) (noting that "[tihe distinction between hard and soft
information is itself soft and opaque").
28. However, some soft information, such as "known material trends and
uncertainties," is required by item 303 of Regulation S-K to be disclosed in a
firm's MD&A. See Securities and Exchange Commission Guidance Regarding
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8350, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29,
2003).
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the firm's internal counsel, who may well be current investors
in the firm and certainly will be sensitive to the impact of dis-
closure on firm stock value. 29
Securities law is thus inconsistent-internally and with
corporation lawO--as regards the temporal conflict. Moreover,
it does not provide a principled basis to judge, from a temporal
standpoint, who the appropriate investor audience should be.
Consequences of the temporal conflict: The temporal conflict
is of real and not merely theoretical concern. 31 For example, be-
29. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures
to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incen-
tives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 86-88, 97-103 (2000) (discussing recent
studies suggesting that even carefully structured pay packages inadvertently
give CEOs incentives to manipulate the timing of disclosure for their own
benefit, such as increasing the value of their stock options at the expense of
shareholders).
30. In the United States, at least, securities law's inconsistency with cor-
poration law is not problematic as a matter of positive law because securities
law is primarily federal, whereas corporation law is state, and federal law pre-
empts conflicting state law. See, e.g., Conkling v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Es-
tabrook, & Weeden, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Mass. 1983) (noting that
federal law has largely superseded state regulation of securities transactions).
Nonetheless, this Article seeks a normative resolution of the temporal conflict,
and in many nations securities and corporation law constitute a single body of
law. See, e.g., David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What You Cannot
See: Securities Regulation on the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 612, 624-25(1998) (observing that Australian corporate law functions in this way). More-
over, scholars argue that securities and corporation law should constitute a
single integrated body of law in the United States. See, e.g., Ralph C. Ferrara
& Marc I. Steinberg, The Interplay Between State Corporation and Federal Se-
curities Law-Santa Fe, Singer, Burks, Maldonado, Their Progeny, & Beyond,
7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (1982) (discussing the need to develop a federal cor-
poration law to fill the gap between state corporation and federal securities
law).
31. This Article focuses on the temporal conflict resulting from disclosing
risk. If firms had the same reluctance to disclose positive information as they
have to disclose risk, a temporal conflict resulting from that reluctance might
mitigate some of the consequences discussed below on the supposition that
benefit to future investors from failure to disclose positive information might
offset harm to future investors from failure to disclose risk. In reality, though,
firms rarely withhold positive information. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at
760 (contrasting the reluctance of firms to disclose negative information with
their willingness to disclose positive information); Marc I. Steinberg, Insider
Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis,
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 635, 658 (2001) ("[a]bsent sound business reasons,
companies normally are pleased to promptly disclose positive information").
For an interesting analysis of a type of temporal conflict regarding disclosure
of positive information, see Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corpo-
rations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 987-91 (1991) (arguing that
current shareholders would want disclosure of positive information, whereas
future shareholders would not want disclosure of positive information until
TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES
cause the audience for disclosure is unclear, corporate actions
viewed ex ante as proper are sometimes judged ex post as
wrongful. Thus, Enron's special-purpose entity (SPE) transac-
tions were disclosed in the notes to its financial statements.3 2
Although that disclosure arguably satisfied securities law stan-
dards,33 and any more prominent disclosure could have harmed
Enron's current investors, many allege in retrospect that En-
ron's failure to give greater prominence to the disclosure misled
future investors in Enron stock.34
The temporal conflict creates other troublesome conse-
quences. Consider, for example, a financial institution with a
portfolio of bad loans that is expected, once the economy im-
proves, to increase in value. Until then, however, generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) would require the finan-
cial institution, if the loans deteriorate further, to periodically
mark-to-market the loan value shown on its balance sheet by
the loans' declining market value. 35 If, however, the financial
institution sells those loans to an independent special-purpose
vehicle and takes back securities in exchange, GAAP might
permit the institution to hold those securities without marking
them to market.36 A financial institution may well decide to en-
after they purchase their shares).
32. WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF
THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, 2000-01 (2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
33. The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of
Frank Partnoy, Prof. of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law), at http://www
.senate.gov/-gov affairs/012402partnoy.htm. [hereinafter Testimony of Frank
Partnoy].
34. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a
World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (discussing this bifurcated
disclosure); cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An
Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 138-39 (1984) (tying the confusion over whether officers
of Equity Funding of America breached their fiduciary duty by disclosing in-
formation about the firm's fraud to the different perspectives of current and
future investors at the time of disclosure).
35. See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ORIGINAL
PRONOUNCEMENTS: ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AS OF JUNE 1, 2004, at FAS 114-
6 20 (2004/2005 ed.).
36. See, e.g., id. at FAS115 [hereinafter FASB Statement No. 115]. FASB
Statement No. 115 classifies most equity securities and all debt securities,
other than loans, id. at FAS115-4 4, held for investment into three catego-
ries based on the intent of the investor: held-to-maturity securities, trading
securities, and available-for-sale securities. Id. at FAS115-5 12. Unlike loan
accounting, unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are ex-
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gage in such a sale on the basis that it owes a duty to its cur-
rent investors, whose investments would be impaired if the
loans are prematurely marked down. Government regulators,
however, might argue that the financial institution, by engag-
ing in such a sale, has acted wrongfully and potentially harmed
future investors. 37
Confusion over the audience similarly raises problems in
the context of credit rating agencies, 38 and indeed accounts for
an intensely-debated conundrum of ratings reliability. Rating
agencies are presently conservative in downgrades to avoid the
risk of a false negative, in which downgrading the rating of
bonds of an otherwise healthy firm can become a self-fulfilling
prophecy, hurting current investors. 39 However, a rating
agency's failure to timely downgrade, like the failure to do so in
Enron, can significantly injure future investors and impair its
credibility. 40 For this reason, some argue that ratings should be
based on (or perhaps even replaced by) market-based tests such
as credit spreads which are more sensitive to the advent of
bond risk, even though their hair-trigger sensitivity raises the
risk of false negatives. 41
cluded from earnings. Id. at FAS115-5 13. If, therefore, the financial institu-
tion in the accompanying text intends to hold the securities it receives in ex-
change for its sale of loans as available-for-sale securities, it would not have to
mark those securities to market.
37. Cf. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, In re PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., Securities
Act Release No. 8112, 78 SEC Docket 5 (July 18, 2002) (involving administra-
tive proceedings instituted by SEC alleging that bank holding company misled
investors by selling loans to a special-purpose vehicle and taking back securi-
ties in exchange, thereby enabling the holding company to hold the exchanged
securities without marking them to market).
38. Rating agencies are private companies that, by reason of their reputa-
tion, are able to issue (for a fee) credit ratings of a firm's debt securities in-
forming investors of the likelihood of timely payment thereon. For a compre-
hensive discussion of rating agencies, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
1.
39. Steven L. Schwarcz, Taking Charge: Authorizing Most Credit-Rating
Agencies Could Increase Economic Efficiency, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 13, 2003, at
6.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?:
Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 657-
59 (1999). There are, of course, many other areas where the temporal conflict
can cause problems. One example is automobile recalls and safety alerts. Car
manufacturers are often faced with the question of how and when to disclose
information concerning potentially unsafe conditions in cars. Releasing more
information (e.g., issuing recalls sooner and for "smaller" problems) would
benefit car buyers (i.e., future owners) but could hurt current car owners by
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This debate cannot be resolved in isolation. Current inves-
tors may prefer ratings to be conservative to protect the in-
vestment value of their securities. Future investors may prefer
market-based tests to better anticipate the possibility of risk
when investing in securities. Which approach is better there-
fore depends, in the first instance, on which audience is viewing
the rating. Unfortunately, as with the other issues of disclosure
discussed above, there is no clear understanding which audi-
ence that should be.
Insight into the temporal conflict also provides consider-
able explanatory power for corporate governance. Consider, for
example, the controversy over contrasting definitions of "inde-
pendence" based on share ownership, as applied to outside di-
rectors. 42 Although this controversy goes beyond disclosure am-
biguity and thus does not present the classic temporal conflict
on which this Article focuses, 43 the temporal conflict informs
the dispute. The standard view on outside director independ-
ence is that of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quota-
tion System (NASDAQ), both of which "affirmatively character-
ize shareownership [sic] as a relationship that does not pre-
clude a determination that a director is independent."44 Their
rationale is that because "the concern is independence from
management, the Exchange does not view ownership of even a
significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an independ-
ence finding."45 A more controversial and indeed unorthodox
position on independence, however, is taken by the Sarbanes-
depressing the resale value of their cars (though even current owners would
benefit to the extent the release protects their safety). Another example is col-
lege rankings. University administrators are faced with the dilemma of how
and when to release potentially damaging information about their institution.
Current students would prefer less disclosure so that the college's reputation
and ranking will remain high, whereas future students would prefer more dis-
closure so they can better understand the risks of choosing that college.
42. For an excellent review of this debate, see Deborah A. DeMott, Inde-
pendent Directors: Beyond Disinterest (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Minnesota Law Review).
43. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
44. DeMott, supra note 42, at 10.
45. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES
303A, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2005); see also Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
47672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,501, 19,501-02 (Apr. 11, 2003) (providing corporate
governance listing standards filed by NYSE).
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Oxley Act, 46 which provides that a shareholder holding as little
as ten percent of any class of a firm's voting securities may not
be treated as "independent" for purposes of service on an audit
committee. 47
The temporal conflict helps to reveal the merit of Sarbanes-
Oxley's position on independence. An audit committee is re-
quired, under Sarbanes-Oxley, to be directly responsible for the
appointment and compensation of the accountants who prepare
the firm's audit reports and perform other audit services. 48 The
audit committee also has oversight responsibility for the exter-
nal auditor's work.49 These new responsibilities "arguably shift
[the] focus [of audit committees] away from an orientation de-
fined in the first instance by the interests of the company's
shareholders and toward the public-regarding orientation of ex-
ternal auditors, whose professional norms and legal duties are
centered on assuring integrity in financial reporting."50 The
temporal conflict provides insight into why a firm's substantial
shareholders should not serve on the audit committee: being
current investors, 51 they will not have the same incentive as fu-
ture shareholders to ensure that the firm's financial results are
fairly presented.52
Nature and scope of the inquiry: This Article focuses pri-
marily on the temporal conflict that arises in corporate disclo-
sure.5 3 My inquiry begins by exploring the problems caused by
46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codif-
ied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
47. DeMott, supra note 42, at 7-8.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (Supp. II 2002).
49. Id.
50. DeMott, supra note 42, at 13.
51. See supra note 3 (defining current investors).
52. Cf. DeMott, supra note 42, at 13.
[Imt's not surprising that rules regarding the composition of audit
committees might depart... from a focus on simply assuring inde-
pendence of directors from the company's management and might re-
flect concern that some of a company's current shareholders may be
less than unswervingly keen that the company's financial results be
fairly presented.
Id.
53. Temporal conflicts also can arise in nondisclosure corporate contexts,
see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, as well as in completely non-
corporate contexts. See infra note 114; cf. E-mail from Jill Fisch, Alpin J. Cam-
eron Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, to the author (Aug. 2, 2004) (on
file with the Minnesota Law Review) (arguing that the temporal conflict in a
nondisclosure corporate context may be even more acute than in a disclosure
context, but observing that any normative resolution of the former temporal
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that temporal conflict. I then examine relevant legal precedents
for resolving the conflict. There are few such precedents under
U.S. law. Because of this paucity, and also to engage the con-
flict from an international perspective, I also examine analo-
gous and foreign legal precedents. Thereafter, I analyze how
the law should treat temporal conflicts from a more normative
perspective.
One must distinguish the scope of my inquiry from the
seemingly related, though fundamentally different, conflict be-
tween the goals of long- and short-term investors. 54 That con-
flict focuses on whether directors should manage "for a long fu-
ture, for expected [as opposed to present] competition, for a
continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture."
55
Short-term investors may prefer immediate profits, while long-
term investors will prefer continuing profits. That conflict,
however, addresses only current long- and short-term inves-
tors. 56 Thus, it is more susceptible to resolution because the
audience is known.
In contrast, the temporal conflict is more abstract: between
current and future investors, irrespective of their long- or
short-term investment intentions. This distinction is funda-
mental. For example, both long- and short-term current inves-
tors will disfavor the downgrading of a firm's bond rating.
However, both long- and short-term future investors will favor
it.57 Also, long- and short-term current investors will, other
conflict would face questions about the extent to which there should be mean-
ingful regulatory limits on management discretion other than prohibitions on
self-dealing).
54. This fundamentally different conflict is discussed as a possible anal-
ogy to the temporal conflict. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
The scope of my inquiry is also much broader than the narrow observation
that, without securities regulation, "current shareholders [would] bear the
costs of disclosure, yet prospective shareholders [would] share in the benefits
of disclosure (i.e., they are free riders)." STAFF OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 95TH CONG., REPORT: THE NATURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 618-56 (House Comm. Print 1977) (primarily the
work of William H. Beaver), reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E.
SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 317,
321 (1980).
55. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
56. For example, the literature on resolving contention between acquiring-
firm and target-firm shareholders in mergers describes this type of conflict be-
cause it is essentially between current shareholders of both firms. See, e.g.,
E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Asymmetric Information in Mergers and the Profits of
Deceit, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507 (1995).
57. Similarly, both long- and short-term current investors will disfavor
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things being equal, disfavor disclosure of a risk; whereas both
long- and short-term future investors will favor such disclosure.
To distinguish these conflicts, I will refer, as needed, to the con-
flict between current long- and short-term investors as a
"static-investor conflict," since (in contrast to the temporal con-
flict) it is a conflict among current (i.e., nonchanging) inves-
tors.5
8
The analysis that follows is not driven by consideration of
how current and future investors would solve the temporal con-
flict if they could somehow bargain. Even if hypothetical cur-
rent and future investors could agree on some particular disclo-
sure regime, 59 the costs of a disclosure regime are not borne
disclosure of a potential problem that may not arise because the disclosure
would impair their investment value in the firm's securities; whereas both
long- and short-term future investors will favor disclosure, which would lower
the price of those securities.
58. In this sense, one might think of the temporal conflict as a "dynamic-
investor conflict" in the sense that it is a conflict between current and future
(i.e., changing) investors.
59. Such agreement on a disclosure regime is not an impossibility. Al-
though the respective interests of current and future investors regarding a
discrete disclosure decision are necessarily antithetical, to the extent today's
"future" investors eventually purchase securities they then would become cur-
rent investors in those securities. However, agreement on a disclosure regime
is unlikely since current investors do not necessarily become future investors,
and at any finite future date there also necessarily will be future investors
who have not yet become current investors. In a different context, one com-
mentator has attempted to solve an intergenerational problem using hypo-
thetical bargain theory. See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corpo-
rate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV.
214, 266-67 (1999). Thomas Smith articulates the problem as a paradox:
If markets cannot perfectly anticipate the timing of cash flows, and
managers have information about the timing of flows superior to the
market, then they will face decisions that in effect force them to
choose among "generations" of shareholders.... One investment
might yield immediate benefits, while another might pay off only
years hence-a payoff that, if we assume imperfect markets, might
not reflect in the current price.
Id. at 266. Smith's methodology for solving this problem, however, appears
somewhat disingenuous. After assuming that investors are all rational-itself
a dubious assumption-he argues that "[r]ational investors are widely diversi-
fied," and because they are widely diversified, they will be "diversified across
all firms," and because they are diversified across all firms:
[I]t seems likely they will be holding securities of firms whose projects
are at all stages of their life cycles [and thus] will own some stock in
firms investing in projects that will not be correctly valued currently
and some stock in firms whose stock is rising only now to correct pre-
viously mistaken valuations.
See id. at 267. These assumptions, however, assume away the underlying
problem.
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solely by current and future investors; there also are costs to
firms issuing securities and to the securities markets.
60 My fo-
cus is on minimizing all of those costs.
61
I. RELEVANT LEGAL PRECEDENTS
U.S. legal precedents: There are few judicial precedents in
the United States, and little scholarship, addressing the tempo-
ral conflict. In general, courts have ignored the distinction be-
tween current and future investors, 62 or have been sloppy when
alluding to it. For example, the court in In re Craftmatic Secu-
rities Litigation63 cites TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.
64
for the proposition that the disclosure standard should be
judged from the standpoint of "a reasonable investor contem-
plating the purchase of securities," 65 whereas the court in
Grossman v. Novell, Inc.66 cites to the same Supreme Court
case for the proposition that the disclosure standard should be
judged from the standpoint of "a reasonable investor ... con-
sider[ing] ... whether to buy or sell stock."67 Technically, how-
ever, the Supreme Court case stands for neither such proposi-
tion. It only holds that disclosure should be judged from the
standpoint of what "a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider... important in deciding how to vote"68-which, if any-
thing, is a current-investor standard since only current share-
holders can vote shares. 69
60. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing all of the inter-
ests affected by disclosure).
61. I therefore do not delve, for example, into a Rawlsian-style examina-
tion of how a hypothetical rational investor unaware of his temporal status
would-if given the chance-choose to order a disclosure regime to minimize
the temporal conflict.
62. See E-mail from Thomas Lee Hazen to the author, supra note 11, at 1
(observing that, to his knowledge, "there has never been an attempt in the ma-
teriality cases to address [the temporal] distinction" between current and fu-
ture investors).
63. 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990).
64. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
65. In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d at 639 (emphasis added).
66. 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 1119 (emphasis added).
68. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
69. I do not claim that the Craftmatic and Grossman courts were funda-
mentally wrong, merely that they were sloppy. Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 231-33 (1988) (assuming that a reasonable investor could be either a
current investor looking to sell or a future investor looking to buy, though fail-




The only context in which U.S. authorities have focused
with any degree of precision on the distinction between current
and future investors is that of delisting securities from a secu-
rities exchange. In In re Midland Resources, Inc.,70 for example,
the SEC issued an order granting an application of the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange to delist stock and subordinated deben-
tures from that exchange. The SEC rejected Midland's argu-
ment that delisting would hurt current investors, reasoning
that "the primary concern in situations of this sort is the pro-
tection of future investors who rely on listing as an indication
that the securities meet the qualifications which such listing
suggests. The adverse effect on present [securities] holders
must yield to that."71 On this same rationale, the SEC reached
similar conclusions in later delisting cases. 72
The SEC's rationale in these delisting cases appears to be
sound, based on their facts. The delisting event in all these
cases clearly heralded the listed firm's imminent demise,7 3 and
was not a technicality. Current investors at that time therefore
already would have lost most of the value of their securities,
with little if anything left to lose by the actual delisting. On the
other hand, continued listing on the exchange would signal that
the firm remained sound, thereby misleading future investors
who could lose their entire new investment. The failure to de-
list thus would create troublesome distributional inequities
70. 46 S.E.C. 861 (1977).
71. Id. at 864.
72. See In re Tassaway, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 706, 709 (1975) (stating that
"[t]hough exclusion from the [NASDAQ quotation] system may hurt existing
investors, primary emphasis must be placed on the interests of prospective fu-
ture investors"); In re Acme Missiles & Constr. Corp., 43 S.E.C. 485, 489(1967) (stating that "while delisting may have adverse effects on present in-
vestors, such effects are outweighed by the protection afforded future purchas-
ers by removing from Exchange trading securities not possessing the applica-
ble qualifications"); In re Fifth Ave. Indus. Corp., 43 S.E.C. 146, 150 (1966)(stating the same proposition as Acme Missiles).
73. In Midland, the firm had suffered continuous losses totalling more
than $42 million over a four-year period and showed no indication of a return
to profitability. 46 S.E.C. at 863-64. In Tassaway, the firm not only failed
NASDAQ's nominal $250,000 capital-plus-surplus requirement but also had a
capital deficit of over $3.4 million. 45 S.E.C. at 708. In Acme Missiles, thefirm's operating activities had effectively ceased operation. 43 S.E.C. at 486.
And in Fifth Avenue Industries, a substantial portion of the firm's operating




that, if left unchecked, could impair the reputation, and there-
fore value, of exchanges in securities markets. 74
Distinguished by the narrow factual context, the delisting
cases do not provide a useful framework for analyzing the tem-
poral conflict. The balance between the interests of current and
future investors usually is much more equal than in those
cases. Those cases also can be distinguished in that they do not
involve disclosure ambiguity.
Scholarship on the temporal conflict is likewise minimal.
Professor Daniel Fischel tacitly recognized the conflict's exis-
tence as the source of confusion in Dirks v. SEC,75 a Supreme
Court case examining, among other things, whether officers of
Equity Funding of America breached their corporate fiduciary
duty by disclosing information about the firm's fraud to an in-
vestment analyst. 76 The Court had held that those officers did
not breach their fiduciary duty because their motivation was
public spirited-to disclose the fraud-and exposure of fraud is
a public good.77 Fischel disagreed with the Court's reasoning,
arguing it "ignores the effects of tipping on the wealth of the
firm's investors,"78 and that the Court should have focused on
"the effect of [the officers'] conduct on investors' wealth [to] de-
termine whether a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred."
79
Taking that focus, Fischel observed that "it could be argued
that the actions by Equity Funding's [officers] were causally re-
lated to the company's eventual bankruptcy, to the obvious det-
riment of its current investors."80 Notwithstanding that detri-
ment, however, Fischel ultimately concluded that the officers
did not violate their fiduciary duty because "a rule that re-
stricts the firm's ability to defraud future investors" would be-
and therefore the officers "were probably" acting--"consistent
with the organizing principles of the firm."81
The only scholarship that directly addresses at least one
aspect of the temporal conflict is a 1991 symposium article by
74. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolv-
ing the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 124 (2004)
(observing that "even the perception of distributional inequities can discourage
market participants by undermining expectations").
75. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
76. Fischel, supra note 34.




81. Id. at 139.
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Professor Henry T.C. Hu. Investigating the process of financial
innovation and the basic pecuniary goals of publicly held firms,
Hu argued that such innovation has rendered "intolerably am-
biguous" the principle that corporations are to be run primarily
for the benefit of their shareholders.8 2 In part, he claimed, this
ambiguity results from increasing stock turnover, creating an
"especially serious" timing problem where, for example, "the
person who happens to hold shares at [the time of] disclosure of
[a worthwhile long-term] investment does not continue to hold
them through the payoff period for the investment."8 3 If, be-
cause of information asymmetry, this disclosure "has the effect
of depressing the trading price[,] the investment would hurt
contemporaneous shareholders and help those who hold shares
in the future as the benefits of the investment[ ] become evi-
dent."8 4 Existing conceptions of the pecuniary goals of corpora-
tions "do not," Hu observed, address such "problems of conflicts
of interest among different generations of shareholders."8 5 Ac-
cordingly, "[t]o the extent that securities laws allow some dis-
cretion in the timing of disclosures, managers have a basic fidu-
ciary problem in terms of which 'generation' of shareholders to
favor."86
Hu therefore recognized the temporal conflict resulting
from discretion in the timing of disclosure, an aspect of the con-
flict that this Article discusses in the context of periodic report-
ing.8 7 He did not, however, discuss the temporal conflict in a
wider disclosure context,8 8 nor did he attempt to engage the
conflict other than identifying its existence as creating "serious
problems because of the increasing proportion of short-term
shareholders."8 9 Nonetheless, Hu's tying of the temporal con-
flict's significance to the increasing proportion of short-term in-
vestors, and thus an increasingly higher turnover of investors
82. Hu, supra note 4, at 1286.
83. Id. at 1287.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1287-88.
86. Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
87. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
88. Although Hu agrees with me that the temporal conflict "is clearest in
the disclosure context," he focuses in that context only on timing of disclosure.
Hu, supra note 4, at 1300. Hu does note, however, that a temporal conflict also
could arise in nondisclosure contexts, such as a firm's decisions about divi-
dends, stock buy-backs, issuance of shares, and mergers and acquisitions. Id.
at 1300-01.
89. Id. at 1303.
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in securities, may help to explain why there are so few prece-
dents. When, as in the past,
turnover levels are low, the problem in fiduciary doctrine is less ma-
terial. Low turnover levels, in effect, provide a practical, partial solu-
tion to a fundamental problem in legal theory....
Unfortunately, the modern financial market is inhospitable to
such a makeshift solution. With financial innovation playing a lead-
ing role, stock turnover has increased dramatically in the past two
generations. 90
The increase in the turnover rate of securities held by in-
vestors therefore makes the temporal conflict an urgent prob-
lem in today's financial environment. 9 1 Given the paucity of
precedents, I next examine potentially analogous legal prece-
dents.
Analogous legal precedents: The most analogous precedents
under U.S. law are those governing the resolution of the static-
investor conflict, since that conflict, like the temporal conflict,
involves time-related considerations. The static-investor con-
flict pits investors who generally hold securities (usually shares
of stock) for long-term capital appreciation and income against
other investors (especially traders) who purchase shares to
profit short term, such as on daily market movements. 92 Short-
term investors will prefer to reap the immediate profits from
investment, while long-term investors may prefer that firms
forego immediate gains in favor of outlays or plans that "opti-
mize long-run firm value."93 Management therefore must de-
cide whether their duty is to maximize short-term shareholder
value or long-term firm value. 94
Corporation law provides limited guidance for making this
decision. A firm's directors only need "chart a course for [the]
90. Id. at 1302.
91. The Connection: The Director's Cut (NPR radio broadcast, Jan.
11, 2005), http://www.theconnection.org/shows/2005/O1/ 20 0 5Ol11la-main.asp.
The turnover rate of securities also links, to some extent, the temporal conflict
with the static-investor conflict. The lower the turnover rate, the smaller the
difference between the identities of current and future investors, and vice
versa. If there were no difference, the temporal conflict would disappear, leav-
ing only the static-investor conflict.
92. See Purvis v. Comm'r, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976); see also
Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
93. Thomas L. Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and In-
vestment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corpo-
rate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 139 (1991) (discussing the managerial conflict
between short-term and long-term interests).
94. See id.
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corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a
fixed investment [time] horizon."95 That course is left to the di-
rectors' business judgment, 96 and there is no general duty to
sacrifice long-term corporate interests for the sake of maximiz-
ing share value in the short term.97 A firm's directors thus of-
ten will side with long-term shareholders in a hostile takeover
context-even where doing so is not necessarily for wholly dis-
interested reasons 9 8-by arguing that the takeover would not
be in the best long-term interests of the firm.99
This limited guidance does not provide insight for resolving
the temporal conflict. The static-investor conflict, and thus any
insight into its resolution, concerns the tension between the in-
terests of long- and short-term current investors. In contrast,
the temporal conflict concerns the tension between current and
future investors, irrespective of whether they have long- or
95. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1989).
96. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (articulating
the business judgment rule).
97. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; cf. Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (holding that a sale of control
obligates directors to "focus on one primary objective-to secure the transac-
tion offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders"); Revlon
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (hold-
ing, in the limited circumstance where a firm is for sale, that management has
a duty to maximize short-term shareholder value). Commentators Martin Lip-
ton and Paul K. Rowe summarize the interplay between Time Inc. and Revlon
nicely:
In Revlon, Delaware required directors to maximize short-term value
once they decided to sell a company for cash. Conversely, Delaware
decided that it would not require directors to maximize short-term
value outside this particularly narrow situation. Delaware companies
are not required to be for sale twenty-four hours a day and seven days
a week. Directors could agree to friendly stock mergers without put-
ting the firm "in play" or having to "auction" the company.
Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Profes-
sor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2002).
98. For example, Thomas Hazen has observed that:
Corporate managers may believe that a hostile takeover attempt
would sacrifice the long-term future of the company in favor of short-
term profit maximization.... Permitting managers to defend against
takeovers allows them to preserve the status quo in hopes that the
company can continue to pursue its long-term objectives. It also per-
mits managers to keep their own jobs.
Hazen, supra note 93, at 195.
99. See id. at 142 (stating that "[t]arget management typically responds
[to a hostile takeover] by resisting, claiming that it is looking out for the long-
term interests of shareholders").
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short-term interests. 100 The dynamic of these two conflicts is
therefore fundamentally different, as illustrated by a real-
world example. Assume that a proposed merger would create
long-term value for a firm. 10 1 Current investors in the firm with
a long-term focus would likely favor the proposed merger. In
contrast, current investors with a short-term focus may not
recognize the merger's long-term value. 02 Undervaluing the
merger, these current investors might favor, say, a competing
takeover offer that maximizes short-term share price.10 3 Under
the law governing this static-investor conflict, the firm's direc-
tors have discretion either to choose the merger and fight the
takeover (as desired by the current investors with a long-term
focus), or oppose the merger and acquiesce to the takeover (as
desired by the current investors with a short-term focus). 10 4
100. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
101. The hypothetical above also assumes that the proposed merger would
not trigger duties under Revlon or otherwise constitute a sale of control. See
supra note 97.
102. See Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1148. On the question of whether current
investors with a short-term focus should recognize long-term value, see Ber-
nard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain
Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 532-33 (2002) (noting that
"[u]nder elementary principles of finance, even short-term investors have an
incentive to maximize the firm's long-term value, because only by doing so can
they maximize the price at which long-term investors will buy the shares that
short-term investors will soon want to sell"); Hazen, supra note 93, at 143
(stating that "[i]f the current price adequately takes account of a company's
long-term prospects, then it would make little sense to talk of long-term
shareholders' interest as distinct from their short-term interest"); id. at 200
(asking why the "efficient market [does] not fairly value" the shares in ques-
tion by factoring in expected long-term prospects in addition to short-term per-
formance); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 336-42 (1990) (discussing how stock market
myopia is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis); Mark A. Sargent,
Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13 (2003) (suggesting that
in a market unhampered by inefficiencies, "if the firm really was sacrificing
the long-term interests of the corporation for short-term benefits in an unjusti-
fiable way, the market would recognize that fact and discount the price of the
firm's securities appropriately").
103. See Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1148.
104. As David Silk and David Katz have observed:
[E]ven if a hostile bid provides greater current and other short-term
value than a merger, and even if that hostile bid provides for an ad-
mittedly fair price, the target's board may attempt to preserve or
achieve for its stockholders the business benefits of the original
merger transaction so long as the original merger does not itself con-
stitute a change of control.
David M. Silk & David A. Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2003, in DOING
DEALS 2004: KEEPING PACE WITH A RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKET 1139, 1175
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The temporal conflict, however, pits the firm's current in-
vestors, irrespective of their long- or short-term focus, against
the firm's future investors, again irrespective of their focus.
The entire dynamic has changed: future investors are indiffer-
ent to the merger-versus-takeover decision because, at the time
of that decision, they do not hold the firm's securities. More-
over, at any future date on which they purchase securities,
such investors can choose freely to purchase the firm's shares,
if fairly valued, 105 or instead to purchase other securities. In
short, the merger-versus-takeover decision neutrally affects fu-
ture investors. Likewise, the idea of giving directors discretion
to decide how to resolve the static-investor conflict does not in-
form the temporal conflict-it is precisely that discretion under
existing law that gives rise to the temporal conflict. Further-
more, such discretion would be subject to agency-cost bias be-
cause directors, who often own securities of the firm, are by
definition current investors and thus have a conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the static-investor conflict does not provide useful
precedents for resolving the temporal conflict.
Precedents from foreign legal systems: The temporal con-
flict can arise in virtually any legal system. Thus it is useful to
examine whether foreign authorities have recognized and
grappled with this conflict.
A line of British Commonwealth cases involving contested
corporate takeovers has been suggested to this author by sev-
eral foreign colleagues as illustrative of the temporal conflict.
The question in these cases was whether directors of the target
firm breached their duty by allotting shares in the firm to third
parties, thereby thwarting a takeover by certain current share-
holders perceived as damaging to the firm's future. Although it
might appear that the rights of current shareholders were thus
pitted against those of future shareholders (i.e., the firm's fu-
ture owners), these cases are better viewed as static-investor
conflicts between competing groups of current investors, with
directors attempting to favor the bloc of current investors that
better serves the firm's long-term interests.106 Moreover, these
(2004).
105. Investors would not be expected to purchase the firm's shares, for ex-
ample, unless they believe the stock price, as adjusted by the market to reflect
the acquisition, is competitive.
106. To this extent, these English common law cases are similar to the
takeover cases discussed in connection with the static-investor conflict, supra
notes 95-104 and accompanying text. Furthermore, these cases do not appear
to involve any disclosure ambiguity, and, absent asymmetric information, fu-
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cases all were decided on narrow, technical grounds-in each
case, whether the firm's directors could use their share allot-
ment power to dictate who would control the firm. 10 7 The cases
therefore do not provide a reliable, much less a principled, basis
for balancing the interests of current and future shareholders.
Indeed, few relevant authorities have been found concern-
ing the temporal conflict. For example, a Company Law Review
Steering Group assigned the task of examining U.K. company
law to suggest reforms recently proposed a concept known as
"enlightened shareholder value," intended to encompass future
as well as present shareholders.10 8 The group's recommenda-
tions, however, are presently in limbo. 109 Also, a leading Eng-
lish-law commentator, J.D. Heydon, has asserted that the
standard for determining directors' duties, "best interests of the
company," means the best interests of "present and future
members" of the company. °10 He then supports that assertion,
however, by arguing that "a long-term view should be balanced
against the short-term interests of present [company] mem-
bers"-suggesting he may be conflating the temporal conflict
and the static-investor conflict.'
ture investors would not even be harmed by the unfavored bloc winning be-
cause the firm's share prices, and thus the cost of shares purchased by future
investors, would fall to reflect the lowered market value.
107. See, e.g., Harlowe's Nominees v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co.
(1968) 121 C.L.R. 483 (High Court of Australia); Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petro-
leum Ltd. 1974 A.C. 821 (P.C. 1974) (appeal taken from Australian court to
English Privy Council); Teck Corp. v. Millar, [1972] D.L.R.3d 288 (British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court); Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., 1 Ch. 254 (1967) (United
Kingdom).
108. E-mail from Brian R. Cheffins, S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate
Law, University of Cambridge, to the author (Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with the
Minnesota Law Review). Professor Cheffins asserts that this concept essen-
tially codifies existing U.K. case law on the duty of directors to act in the best
interests of their firms. Id.; see also PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIE'S
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAw 377-78 (7th ed. 2003).
109. E-mail from Brian R. Cheffins to the author, supra note 108.
110. J.D. Heydon, Directors'Duties and the Company's Interests, in EQUITY
AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 120, 123 (P.D. Finn ed., 1987). This same
viewpoint, that the best interests of the firm are those of both its present and
future members, is taken in E. MILNER HOLLAND, Q.C., BD. OF TRADE, THE
SAVOY HOTEL LIMITED AND THE BERKELEY HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED:
INVESTIGATION UNDER SECTION 165(b) OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1948: REPORT
OF MR. E. MILNER HOLLAND, Q.C. 16 (1954).
111. Heydon, supra note 110, at 123. Again, this same viewpoint is seen in
E. MILNER HOLLAND, Q.C., supra note 110, at 16 (a firm's board of directors
should "balance a long-term view against short-term interests of present
members"). To confuse matters further, another leading English-law scholar,
commenting specifically on Heydon's assertion, observes that although "there
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None of these authorities provides a meaningful frame-
work for analysis. I therefore begin the analysis from first prin-
ciples.
II. ANALYSIS
How should the temporal conflict be resolved? This is a
normative question and requires a normative answer. 112 The
temporal conflict reflects, at its core, an information asymmetry
problem-the degree to which information about a firm's risks
should be disclosed, directly or through ratings, where there is
disclosure ambiguity. 113 My analysis therefore begins by focus-
ing on the information asymmetry problem, and then considers
the consequences of disclosure for current and future inves-
tors. 
14
Eliminating information asymmetry: The most obvious way
to solve this information asymmetry problem is for the firm is-
suing securities (issuer) to provide investors-both current and
future-with all possible information, thereby reducing the in-
formation asymmetry. This suggests that the temporal conflict
could be resolved by providing maximum disclosure. In a per-
fect universe where disclosure eliminates all information
asymmetry, there should be little difference between the audi-
ence of current investors and future investors because prices
have already adjusted to reflect all information. 115
is some authority for extending [the duty of a firm's directors] to future share-
holders as well as present ones[,] I do not find that expression of directors' du-
ties particularly helpful." I.A. Renard, Commentary, in EQUITY AND
COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 110, at 137, 138.
112. Indeed, any positive law resolution of the temporal conflict would be
misleading to the extent it is country-specific and constrained by idiosyncra-
sies in the country's laws.
113. Recall that the temporal conflict effectively arises only where there is
disclosure ambiguity since a clear and credible risk must be disclosed irrespec-
tive of the impact on current and future investors. See supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text.
114. One could apply this same approach to more generic temporal con-
flicts, such as automobile recalls, safety alerts, and college rankings. See supra
note 41. The temporal conflict reflects, at its core, an information asymmetry
problem-the degree to which information about risks associated with an en-
tity should be disclosed, directly or indirectly, where there is disclosure ambi-
guity. Only after that problem is analyzed can one take into account the con-
sequences of disclosure to current and future concerned third parties. The
analysis therefore should begin by focusing on the information asymmetry
problem, and then take those consequences into account.
115. Or, in other words, markets are semi-strong efficient, reacting in-
stantly and correctly to all information as it is disclosed to the public. See, e.g.,
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That solution, however, is flawed in the imperfect universe
in which we live. Experience shows that no disclosure regime
can completely eliminate information asymmetry. 116 Further-
more, contrary to intuition, at some point maximizing disclo-
sure does not reduce, but actually increases, asymmetric infor-
mation. This occurs for two reasons. First, disclosure of a
profusion of details can simply obfuscate and confuse investors,
and some investors may not even have the time to review much
less fully evaluate the disclosure. 1 7 Even the most sophisti-
cated investors can suffer information overload. 118 This concern
is well illustrated by a leading decision of the full court of the
Federal Court of Australia, involving the adequacy of disclosure
in a prospectus describing a proposed acquisition of a mutual
insurance company and plans to demutualize it.119 Even under
a materiality standard, 120 the court rejected allegations that
the disclosure was inadequate because it did not set forth every
possible formulation of the commercial objective of the pro-
posal, and arguments for and against those possibilities. It rea-
soned that such comprehensive disclosure
would be likely to confuse rather than to illuminate the issue for deci-
sion, even for people having a familiarity with corporate law and
commerce. The need to make full and fair disclosure must be tem-
pered by the need to present a document that is intelligible to reason-
Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The "Less than" Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis:
Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 81, 102-03 (2004).
116. Cf. infra note 158 and accompanying text (observing that disclosure
regimes have failed to eliminate ambiguities). Moreover, future risks cannot
be precisely assessed, and often are unknown.
117. Steven E. Bocher & Samir Bukari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure
Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, in
SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET 2002: DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF
ENRON & CURRENT SEC DISCLOSURE INITIATIVES 397, 416 (2002) (observing
that "opt[ing] on the margin to disclose rather than not... would result in the
dissemination of information that could work to crowd out information of
genuine interest to investors"); Paredes, supra note 12 (arguing that the exist-
ing disclosure system may subject investors, analysts, and other securities
market participants to information overload); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 34 (ar-
guing that as transaction structures become more complex, the disclosure be-
comes so complex that investors may be unable to understand it).
118. Paredes, supra note 12, at 454-55 (observing that "[s]everal studies
and experiments show that experts can become overloaded, even if they can
effectively use more information than non-experts ... [t]his should not be sur-
prising given that everybody--experts and non-experts alike-has limited
cognitive abilities").
119. Fraser v. NRMA Holdings Ltd. (1995) 55 F.C.R. 452.
120. Id. at 467-68.
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able members of the class to whom it is directed, and is likely to assist
rather than to confuse .... 121
The court stressed that disclosure must be both practical and
realistically useful:
In complex cases it may be necessary to be selective in the informa-
tion provided, confining it to that which is realistically useful .... It is
important that the adequacy of the information provided by the pro-
spectus and supporting documents be assessed in a practical, realistic
way having regard to the complexity of the proposal.
122
The second reason that maximizing disclosure does not
necessarily reduce and actually can increase asymmetric in-
formation is that-even absent a profusion of details-
behavioral psychology shows that people, and therefore inves-
tors, are not rational assessors of information. They overesti-
mate the chances that something they recently became aware
of, like airplane crashes or illnesses, will happen.123 Likewise,
investors may well overestimate the likelihood and impact of
121. Id. at 468.
122. Id. Similar arguments have been made in the United States:
Reasonable investors do not want to know everything that could go
wrong, without regard to probabilities; that would clutter registration
statements and obscure important information. Issuers must winnow
things to produce manageable, informative filings.... Their approach
is ex ante. Issuers and underwriters must decide what information
will be useful without burying investors under a blizzard of paper.
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1989);
George S. Branch & James A. Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures
Under the Federal Securities Law, in 2 SELECTED ARTICLES OF FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAw 15, 17 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991) (citing Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Cer-
tain Investment Company Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 6 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,193, 62,842 n.10, 62,846 n.23 (May 18, 1989)) (observ-
ing that, as a practical matter, a firm issuing securities does not want to con-
sider all remote possibilities, and investors do not want to read overly lengthy
disclosures).
123. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003) (observing that people have a tendency to overes-
timate the probability that salient risks will occur, such as overestimating the
risks of flying due to the newsworthiness of plane crashes even though car
crashes are much more common); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analy-
sis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1662-63 (1998) (ob-
serving that probability exaggeration may occur when an event is "available,"
or comes readily to a person's mind, with the most available events being
those that have received a large amount of media attention); Larry E. Rib-
stein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46 (2002) (discussing the "avail-
ability heuristic," such as the exaggerated perception of a wide range of risks,
from corporate fraud to nuclear power accidents, given prominence in the me-
dia).
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disclosed potential risks.124 This overestimation itself creates a
form of information asymmetry. 125
For these reasons, maximizing disclosure harms existing
investors but does not necessarily benefit future investors. 126
Since maximizing disclosure is not the answer, I next examine
more nuanced solutions, including economic theory on solving
the information asymmetry problem, which economists often
refer to as the "Lemons" problem.
Economic theory on solving the asymmetric information
problem: Economists ask how transactions ever occur if the
seller has more information than the buyer and the information
disparity cannot be cured (at least at reasonable cost). The
problem was first systematically studied by George Akerlof,127
using the crude but intuitive example of the used-car market:
From time to time one hears either mention of or surprise at the large
price difference between new cars and those which have just left the
showroom.... The individuals in this market buy a new automobile
without knowing whether the car they buy will be good or a lemon.
But [overall market statistics enable them to] know that with [a high]
probability it is a good car and with [a lower] probability.. . it is a
lemon .... After owning a specific car, however, for a length of time,
the car owner can form a good idea of the quality of this machine; i.e.,
the owner assigns a new probability to the event that his car is a
lemon. This estimate is more accurate than the original estimate. An
asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now
have more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But
[absent a solution,] good... and bad [used] cars must still sell at the
same price-since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference be-
tween a good [used] car and a bad [used] car.128
124. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 12, at 455 (citing a "vast behavioral fi-
nance literature suggest[ing] that securities market professionals, like lay in-
vestors, are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases that affect investment deci-
sions"); PETER H. HUANG, REGULATING ANXIETY AND EXCITEMENT: AFFECTIVE
INVESTING AND EFFECTIVE SECURITIES REGULATION 54 (2002), at http://www
.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/adhoc/summer2002/huang.pdf (observing that the
regulatory policy of mandatory disclosure can have "unintended and undesired
consequences," such as investors overreacting to a material event that has a
small probability of occurring).
125. But cf. Letter from Eric T. Spink to author, supra note 8 (suggesting
"that, by exposing investors to disclosure of potential risks, investors (more
likely, their professional advisors) will become more capable of rationally as-
sessing those risks and the risk of over-reaction should be reduced").
126. To this extent, the optimal degree of disclosure is not predetermined
by the relevant investor audience.
127. Akerlof won the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics for his work on this
problem. See The Nobel Foundation, at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laure
ates/2001/ (last modified Feb. 14, 2005).
128. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Akerlof argues that it is up to the seller to achieve a solu-
tion to this problem of quality uncertainty: "those [merchants]
who can identify used cars in our example and can guarantee
the quality may profit."'129
One obvious solution is guaranties, 130 such as warranties
on the sale of goods,' 3 ' to shift the risk from the buyer to the
seller. Other institutions that have arisen to counteract this
problem are brand-name goods, 132 chains (such as hotel and
restaurant chains), 133 and governmental and private-sector cer-
tification through, for example, licensing. 34 Brand-name goods
and chains, however, appear to be indirect guaranties made by
placing the reputation of the goods or the chain as a hostage. If
the goods are defective, or the chain provides inferior quality,
the reputation suffers. Therefore, one can view the possible so-
lutions as being in two categories: protect the buyer of (in our
context) securities either by (1) direct or indirect guaranties of
their value or (2) governmental and/or private-sector certifica-
tion of their quality. I examine these protections in turn.
Direct guaranties would not work to the extent that issuers
of securities, by the very nature of securities, already make
themselves liable to investors for repayment. 3 5 There nonethe-
less may be ways to create indirect guaranties, such as bonds
or hostages to be sacrificed in the event of management exploi-
tation of the information asymmetry. An obvious approach is to
provide for case-by-case ex post review of, and some form of
punishment for, management exploitation of the information
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488-89 (1970) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 496 (emphasizing that "these skills are equally necessary-both
to be able to identify the quality of inputs and to certify the quality of out-
puts").
130. Id. at 499.
131. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-315 (2003) (providing for warranties on
the sale of goods).
132. Akerlof, supra note 128, at 499.
133. Id. at 500.
134. Id.
135. In the case of debt securities, the issuer is liable as a recourse obliga-
tion; and even equity securities give investors residual claims against the is-
suer. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking A Corporation's Obligations to
Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667 (1996). Moreover, any scheme to in-
crease the priority of equity investors' residual claims would be problematic:
making those claims pari passu with the issuer's debt claims would dilute re-
covery on the latter, merely shifting some of the losses from the issuer's equity
investors to the issuer's debt investors; whereas keeping the residual claims
subordinate to debt claims would not improve the position of equity investors.
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asymmetry (or otherwise to use ex post review as a sort of bond
that substitutes for ex ante screening of the transaction). To
some extent, this review is already performed by administra-
tive agencies such as the SEC (in the United States) and
through litigation in courts.136 In those cases, the punishment
includes civil liability and possible criminal prosecution of
management. 137
An ex post approach, however, is a blunt instrument. It
poorly filters bad actions because they will be discovered only
after they occur. Furthermore, it creates uncertainty for, and
imposes a chilling effect on, good actions because unlikely
events sometimes do occur. 138 Where such events cause inves-
tors to lose money, management must argue ex post, possibly in
the face of adverse publicity and zealous government officials,
that its failure to disclose that event was justifiable. 139 Nor has
136. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001) (describing how
the United States has partially solved the "information asymmetry problem
through a complex set of laws and private and public institutions that give in-
vestors reasonable assurance that the issuer is being (mostly) truthful"). Rule
10b-5 under the '34 Act, for example, makes it unlawful for any person in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) To make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c)
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2004).
137. In the United States, securities-fraud causes of action may be crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative in nature. SEC Enforcement Activities, 17 C.F.R.
§ 202.5(b) (2004). For an overview of possible civil, criminal, and administra-
tive actions taken in the event of securities law violations, see Alyssa Hall &
Adam M. Schoeberlein, Securities Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 941, 985-99
(2000), and William S. Lerach, "The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995-27 Months Later" Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597
(1998) (discussing class action lawsuits as a possible response to management
exploitation of information asymmetry).
138. Cf. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 773, 774,
778 (2004) (observing that people tend to view past events as having been in-
evitable, and also tend in hindsight to mistake innocent or even good actions
as misconduct); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judg-
ing in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572 (1998) (arguing that "the defen-
dant's level of care will seem less reasonable in hindsight than it did in fore-
sight").
139. It is human nature to infer the obvious, though incorrect, cause from a
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the existing system of ex post review and punishment yet re-
solved the temporal conflict.
The second approach to protecting investors is to certify
the quality of their securities, either through government or
reputable private-sector entities. Governmental certification is
a form of merit regulation,140 and can be expensive. In the con-
text of the original enactment of the federal securities laws in
the United States, government certification was explicitly re-
jected as unworkable for that reason. 14 1 At that time, there was
significant controversy whether a securities law should focus on
requiring full disclosure or on imposing governmental merit
analysis. 142 State "blue sky" laws provided for both. 143 Nonethe-
less, Congress, after "considerable debate ... decided not to fol-
low the pattern of the state acts and eschewed the idea of a
[merit regulation] approach, opting instead for a system of full
disclosure."'144 Governmental merit regulation simply does not
appear to be cost effective.145
dramatic event. Cf. DON HERALD, THE HAPPY HYPOCHONDRIAC 64 (1962) (a
humorous book in which, after surviving numerous imagined scares, a hypo-
chondriac ultimately dies of old age; but on his gravestone is written the
words, "I told you I was no hypochondriac"); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking
Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 592 (1999)
(arguing that ex post judicial reassessment of a troubled debtor's determina-
tion whether offered liquidity is likely to help the debtor rehabilitate may
cause the 'liquidity [to] dry up because few liquidity providers would be will-
ing to be second guessed"); supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining why people do not rationally assess cause and effect).
140. Indeed, at a fundamental level, government regulation and govern-
ment certification are related concepts; the government effectively certifies as
'legal" only those transactions that comply with the regulation.
141. See Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62
MICH. L. REV. 607, 615 (1964) (arguing that the "main argument for disclosure
was that a regulatory approach was not administratively practical").
142. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2 (4th
ed. 2002).
143. Id. at 20 (observing that "the state blue sky laws not only focused on
providing investors with full disclosure of relevant facts, but also required that
all securities registered thereunder 'qualify' on a merit basis, evaluating the
substantive terms of the securities to be offered").
144. Id. at 21-22. Part of Congress's rationale was that a disclosure ap-
proach would avoid any implication that, by approving issuance of a security,
the government was guaranteeing its soundness. James M. Landis, The Legis-
lative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30, 34
(1959).
145. There is little current literature on government certification of securi-
ties quality because, until recently, disclosure was seen as the complete an-
swer. It is not, however, entirely clear whether Congress's decision to favor
disclosure over merit regulation reflected a fair test of the latter. The "blue sky
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Certification of the quality of securities by private-sector
entities likewise does not appear to be feasible. In fact, al-
though a form of private-sector certification of quality already
exists-the ratings system provided by nongovernmental rating
agencies on the safety of debt securities146-it has proven inef-
fective for solving the problems caused by the temporal conflict.
While valuable, ratings are limited. They are presently only
given on debt, not equity, securities.147 Ratings also do not pur-
port to certify against fraud, 148 nor would it appear to be cost
effective for rating agencies to do so. 149 Possibly for this reason,
the rating agencies failed to predict Enron's demise, and En-
ron's debt was not downgraded below investment grade until
days before its bankruptcy.1 50 Moreover, ratings themselves are
subject to a significant temporal conflict. 15 1
An indirect form of private-sector certification of quality is
also performed by outside professionals involved in the issu-
ance of securities. Traditionally, a professional gatekeeper-
such as an independent auditor, securities analyst, investment
banker, or, at times, a lawyer--"represents to the market...
laws proved to be relatively ineffective in stamping out securities frauds, espe-
cially on a national level." HAZEN, supra note 142, at 20. However, at least one
commentator argues that such ineffectiveness "should not condemn this type
of [substantive] control. The States had effective power only within their
boundaries. And the amazing interstate complexity of the security business
made action by the separate States conspicuously ineffective." William 0.
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 531 (1934).
146. Partnoy, supra note 41; Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 3.
147. Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 6. Although stock analysts "certify" equity
securities in the very limited sense of providing buy or sell recommendations,
these are not certifications of quality per se but a balancing of quality and
price, and often are notoriously unreliable. See, e.g., Paul M. Healy & Krishna
G. Palepu, The Fall ofEnron, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2003, at 3, 16-21.
148. Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 6.
149. Rating agencies do not presently have the resources, such as investi-
gative staff, to investigate possible fraud of the companies whose securities
they are rating. Interview with John Rutherford, Jr., President and Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, Moody's Corporation, and Raymond W. McDaniel, President,
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Durham, N.C. (Duke Law School) (Sept. 24,
2002) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). If a rating agency
were to obtain such resources, there is concern that the greatly increased staff-
ing and size would bureaucratize the ratings process (making individual staff
members feel less personally responsible), with unintended consequences. Id.
Moreover, this increased staffing, along with the premium required to offset
litigation and settlement costs resulting from failures to discover fraud, would
significantly increase the cost of ratings, potentially undermining their eco-
nomic vitality.
150. Testimony of Frank Partnoy, supra note 33.
151. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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that it has evaluated the issuer's product ... [in] good faith and
that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the
innovation."152 Post-Enron, however the public has lost confi-
dence, at least temporarily, in traditional gatekeeper mecha-
nisms.153 Moreover, gatekeepers may well be subject to the
same information asymmetry to which investors are subject.
Another indirect form of private-sector certification of qual-
ity is management's signaling, to investors, that management
believes in the issuer. Traditionally, management does this by
investing in the issuer's stock and by accepting stock options as
compensation. 154 This certification did not prove reliable, how-
ever, in Enron.
Traditional economic solutions to the asymmetric informa-
tion problem thus do not resolve the temporal conflict. Accord-
ingly, this Article next seeks a second-best solution.
Second-best solutions: Given the continued existence of an
information asymmetry problem, I now examine whether the
resulting temporal conflict can be minimized.155 Because the
temporal conflict only arises where there is disclosure ambigu-
ity, 156 one possibility is to design a disclosure system that
minimizes the degree of ambiguity inherent in a disclosure de-
cision.
Existing disclosure regimes all have that goal, yet they
have failed to eliminate such ambiguities. The SEC believes
that ambiguities necessarily result from any articulated disclo-
sure standard. 157 Moreover, although some regimes even pro-
vide lists of information or events likely requiring disclosure in
an attempt to reduce disclosure ambiguity, regulators them-
selves admit that lists cannot anticipate all possible future cir-
152. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 620.
153. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid,"57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1416-17, 1420 (2002).
154. A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 570-71 (Bryan A. Garner ed.
1999).
155. One reviewer of this Article asked if the consequences to investors of
the temporal conflict somehow could be mitigated by diversifying investment
portfolios as a function of time. I do not see how that could be done. Even if it
could, the transaction costs of actively achieving, monitoring, and maintaining
such a perfectly timed investment portfolio would be high, if not prohibitive.
156. The temporal conflict is the conflict over which audience to favor when
there is a disclosure ambiguity. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text;
see also supra note 113.
157. Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A
Call for Action, supra note 11, at 1155-56.
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cumstances in which disclosure should occur, and do not re-
move all discretion on the final disclosure decision.158 As a
practical matter, therefore, some degree of ambiguity appears
to be inherent in any disclosure system.
The existing disclosure strategies employed in the United
States and other nations with large securities markets do not
directly confront that inherent ambiguity. 159 Rather, these
strategies assume there usually is a "correct" binary disclosure
decision--disclose or do not disclose-that, with enough care, is
ascertainable ex ante. 160 That assumption, though, has given
158. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43, 154, and Investment Company
Act Release No. 24,599, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,319, 83,684 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading] (listing seven "types of information or events that should be reviewed
carefully to determine whether they are material" in a selective disclosure con-
text but cautioning that, by listing such items, the SEC "do[es] not mean to
imply that each of these items is per se material" and that "[t]he information
and events on this list still require determinations as to their materiality" and
further cautioning that the SEC "do[es] not and cannot create an exclusive list
of events and information that have a higher probability of being considered
material"); H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., GUIDE ON DISCLOSURE OF PRICE-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION (2002), at 3-4, http://www.hkgem.com/listingrules/
e-price-guide.pdf (listing sixteen events that likely require disclosure, but as-
serting that although certain items may be listed as common examples of
price-sensitive [i.e. material] information, "no definitive list" of such items can
be given; ultimately "[d]eciding on what information is price-sensitive is a
matter of judgement [sic]" for company directors); U.K. LISTING AUTH., THE
UKLA's GUIDANCE ON THE DISSEMINATION OF PRICE SENSITIVE INFORMATION
6 (2001), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ukla/2001instruments/guidance-manualnov/
guidance2_nov.pdf [hereinafter THE PSI GUIDE] (noting that "[p]recisely what
will constitute price sensitive [i.e. material] information will vary widely from
company to company, depending on a variety of factors," and that conse-
quently "[i]t is therefore not possible to set out a formula for identifying price
sensitive information that will cover all possible permutations and situa-
tions").
159. The United Kingdom and Hong Kong, however, indirectly confront the
inherent ambiguity of disclosure decisions by encouraging firms that are in
doubt about disclosure to contact the applicable securities regulator for guid-
ance. See H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., supra note 158, at 1 (encouraging
issuers that are in doubt about disclosure to contact the exchange); THE PSI
GUIDE, supra note 158, at 8 (stating that "[i]f a company is uncertain whether
a matter should be announced the UKLA provides a Helpline which provides
advice on such matters"). Even assuming this approach reduces uncertainty, it
appears to be expensive and cumbersome.
160. For example, some reason:
Where there is a duty to disclose a material fact, whether in accor-
dance with mandatory disclosure rules or anti-fraud rules, the mate-
riality of that particular fact determines whether an individual or en-
tity is obligated to disclose that fact. Either the fact is material and
must be disclosed, or it is not material and need not be disclosed.
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rise to the temporal conflict and resulting costs discussed in the
introduction of this Article. 161
Focusing on the inherent ambiguity of disclosure decisions,
however, reveals a way to procedurally mitigate the temporal
conflict. That inherent ambiguity means that, contrary to ac-
cepted doctrine, a disclosure decision is sometimes not truly bi-
nary-disclose or do not disclose-because there is no "correct"
answer. If the decision-making process somehow could be trans-
formed into a binary process, however, the temporal conflict
over which audience to favor when there is a disclosure ambi-
guity would be minimized.
There is, I believe, an effective way to transform the exist-
ing decision-making process into more of a binary process: in-
corporate into the existing process a rule dictating in advance
which way a disclosure decision should be made when facing
disclosure ambiguity. 162 Although this procedural bright-line
rule cannot entirely eliminate uncertainty-there still will be
cases at the margin in which the existence of disclosure ambi-
guity itself will be uncertain, thereby creating uncertainty
whether to apply the bright-line rule 16 3 -it could dramatically
reduce the uncertainty by rendering certain a significant por-
tion of otherwise ambiguous disclosure decisions. This rule also
should be easy to apply since it does not purport to change the
Heminway, supra note 11, at 1148. In the exclusive context of selective disclo-
sure under Regulation FD, the SEC has stated it will not "second-guess[ ]...
close materiality judgments" or "bring enforcement actions under Regulation
FD for mistaken materiality determinations that were not reckless." Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 158. However, some commentators
have suggested that recent Regulation FD enforcement actions show that, in
practice, the SEC is, in fact, second-guessing managements' materiality judg-
ments. See John J. Huber & Thomas J. Kim, The SEC's Regulation FD-Fair
Disclosure 4-5, 62 (2003), at http://www.lw.com/resource/publications/_pdf/
pub619.pdf. There may be more flexibility, however, when disclosing "soft" in-
formation. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
162. I later argue that of the two ways such a rule could dictate in advance
which way anambiguous disclosure decision should be made-requiring man-
agement either to: (1) disclose when in doubt, or (2) not disclose when in
doubt-the preferred rule is the latter. See infra notes 165-96 and accompany-
ing text.
163. In this context, I considered whether it might be appropriate to try to
define what constitutes a disclosure ambiguity. I concluded it was inappropri-
ate since any such definition would effectively shift the disclosure standard
from the existing materiality standard to a new standard with its own inher-
ent ambiguities. Cf. infra note 164 and accompanying text (clarifying my in-
tent not to change existing disclosure standards).
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current materiality standard for disclosure or otherwise affect
substantive law; the rule merely sets a disclosure procedure
where the current materiality standard results in ambiguity.
The rule would not apply, for example, to a decision whether to
disclose a sizable lawsuit against a firm for dumping toxic
chemicals into a river (unambiguously material), nor would it
apply to a decision whether to disclose a frivolous lawsuit such
as one alleging the firm planted microchips in the plaintiffs
brain (unambiguously nonmaterial). Thus, the rule is funda-
mentally different from proposals to adopt a bright-line rule for
disclosure to replace or define the standard of materiality.164
My proposed rule would only be justified, however, if the
net cost of disclosure with that rule is lower than the net cost of
disclosure without that rule, taking into account any increased
costs imposed by the rule and any cost reductions from the
rule's reduced uncertainty. In each case costs to current inves-
tors, to future investors, to firms issuing securities, and, to the
extent not already taken into account, to securities markets
should be included.165 Because the net cost of disclosure with-
out that rule is merely the net cost of the existing disclosure re-
gime, this inquiry can be restated more succinctly: a bright-line
rule dictating in advance which way an ambiguous disclosure
decision should be made would be justified if the cost reduc-
tions from the rule's greater certainty exceed the rule's in-
creased costs.
164. For discussion regarding proposals to adopt a bright-line rule for dis-
closure to replace or define the standard of materiality, see Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 233-36 (1988) (concluding that although a "bright-line rule
indeed is easier to follow than a standard [like materiality] that requires the
exercise of judgment in light of all the circumstances ... [] [a]ny approach
that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an in-
herently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overin-
clusive or underinclusive"); Heminway, supra note 11, at 1155-56 (comment-
ing on the SEC's recent conclusion that "any bright-line rule" for disclosure
that replaces a materiality standard unavoidably results in over- or under-
inclusion); Herbert S. Wander, Securities Law Disclosure After Sarbanes-
Oxley, June 2003, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 218 (2003) (argu-
ing that "[t]he quest for specific bright lines to define materiality is doomed to
failure").
165. These categories comprise all the interests affected by disclosure. See,
e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1141 (2003)
(discussing how immediate disclosure could imprecisely reduce the value of a
firm); Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Direc-
tors in American Corporations, 46 AM J. COMP. L. 317, 333-35 (1998) (observ-
ing that disclosure informs both current and future investors about their in-
vestment, and that markets are affected by disclosure).
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To compare those costs, one needs to articulate the actual
bright-line rule. There are two ways a bright-line rule could
dictate in advance which way an ambiguous disclosure decision
should be made: management could be required either to dis-
close when in doubt (i.e., err on the side of disclosing) or not to
disclose when in doubt (i.e., err on the side of not disclosing). I
next examine which bright-line rule-erring on the side of dis-
closing or of not disclosing-has lower costs in cases of disclo-
sure ambiguity. I then analyze whether that lower-cost rule is
justified by comparing the cost reductions from its greater cer-
tainty to the rule's increased costs.
A bright-line rule requiring management to disclose when
in doubt would trigger a one-time transitional market-price ad-
justment to the additional disclosed risk, hurting then-existing
current investors. 166 Although this rule theoretically would pro-
tect future investors by disclosing all ambiguously material
risks, that protection would have to be balanced against the
rule's recurring costs. For example, erring in favor of disclosure
can lead to a profusion of detail that obfuscates and confuses
future investors, making it more difficult for them to review
and evaluate the prospectus. 167 Moreover, behavioral psychol-
ogy predicts that investors may well overreact to some dis-
closed risks, 68 making future investors less likely to invest in
the securities than if the risks were not disclosed. 169 Erring on
the side of disclosure thus would harm those future investors
who suffer an opportunity cost by not investing in the securi-
ties. 17o Furthermore, in a world of evolving international capi-
166. Future investors who subsequently become current investors should
not be hurt since the additional disclosure made pursuant to this rule would
have reduced the market price of the securities prior to their purchase. One
commentator has suggested that to the extent current investors control the
firm, perhaps they should bear this cost. In reality, however, even equity in-
vestors have only indirect control (through electing management), and inves-
tors are equally, if not more, likely to be debt investors.
167. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing that people
overestimate the chances that something they recently become aware of will
happen). This cost, based on irrational overreaction, is different from the more
rational one-time transitional market-price adjustment to additional disclosed
risk discussed supra note 166 and accompanying text.
169. Also, because future investors recognize that they will become current
investors once they purchase securities, some future investors may choose not
to invest out of concern that disclosure made during the period they would be
current investors will depress the price of their securities.
170. In a thick market for investment securities, this opportunity cost
would be reduced to the extent future investors can find equivalent substitute
1080 [89:1044
2005] TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVES 1081
tal markets, erring on the side of disclosure may impose com-
petitive costs on the markets themselves, driving some future
investors to invest in other, perhaps foreign, reputable markets
with lower perceived risks. 171 Thus, erring on the side of disclo-
sure where there is disclosure ambiguity does not necessarily
increase, but may well decrease, transparency and drive inves-
tors to other markets. 172
This conclusion is supported by finance theory. Erring on
the side of disclosing ambiguously material risks would inject
what Professor Fischer Black refers to as "noise" into the mar-
ket alongside information. 173 In Black's conceptualization, "in-
formation" is any item of data that correctly reflects a stock's
fundamental value, 174 while "'[n]oise' is any [item of] data that
is not information."'175 Accordingly, information is useful to
market participants for trading purposes, whereas noise is not
useful, or worse, detrimental to profitable trading.176
Telling the difference between noise and information can
sometimes be difficult, especially if noise abounds. 177 Investors
then can confuse noise with information and mistakenly "trade
on the noise as if it were information."'178 This not only causes
investments.
171. Erring on the side of disclosure appears more likely to drive future in-
vestors to other markets with lower perceived risks than to cause them to de-
mand a discount; this reflects that overreaction itself is irrational, and thus
future investors may find it difficult to price a discount. See supra note 168
and accompanying text.
172. Whether or not those markets presently exist, they may well exist in
the future, especially if there is investor demand for alternative securities.
Some investors might also invest in domestic nonsecurities investments,
thereby weakening securities market demand.
173. See generally Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986) (distinguish-
ing noise from information).
174. Id. at 532-33. A stock's true value is an elusive thing, however. See id.
("All estimates of value are noisy, so we can never know how far away price is
from value.").
175. Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L.
REV. 713, 718 (1995).
176. Black, supra note 173, at 529.
177. Id. at 534.
178. Id. at 529, 531, 534. In a sense, noise mimics information and com-
petes antagonistically with it for investor attention. Additionally, some inves-
tors may trade on noise for the simple reason that "they like to do it." Id. at
534. Some noise theorists "postulate that a substantial portion of traders in
the market are irrational, in the sense that they suffer testable cognitive bi-
ases that impede their collective ability to coldly calculate the intrinsic value
of securities." Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM
and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO
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markets to become less efficient,179 but creates a risk that mar-
ket-pricing errors "will be cumulative, in the same sense that a
drunk tends to wander farther and farther from his starting
point."18 0
Applying Black's formulation to the temporal conflict, risks
that are ambiguously material include both noise and informa-
tion. Disclosing those ambiguously material risks, therefore,
would introduce into the market both noise that looks like in-
formation and information that looks like noise.181 Investors
then would have difficulty distinguishing noise from informa-
tion, and could mistakenly trade on the noise in the incorrect
belief it is information. The result would be that securities
markets become less efficient and subject to cumulative pricing
errors.
Even worse, disclosing ambiguously material risks may ac-
tually exacerbate the temporal conflict. This results because
noise trading can increase investors' focus on the short term,
and thus bring about more volatile markets: "noise traders may
overreact to information, thus forcing inordinate attention on
short-term performance and increasing volatility."18 2 Short-
term investment focus and market volatility increase the secu-
rities turnover rate,18 3 which in turn increases the impact of
L. REV. 475, 478 (1997). As noise increases, these traders have more chances
to focus on extraneous data that has emotional appeal but little actual utility
from a valuation standpoint and commit valuation errors that, when aggre-
gated, cause inefficient pricing of shares. Id. ("Because noise traders act on
psychological impulse ('noise') rather than true information, their trading
tends to drive stock prices away from best estimates of fundamental values.").
179. Black, supra note 173, at 532.
180. Id.
181. Even those in the best position to know the difference-a firm's offi-
cers and professional advisors-will have difficulty separating the informa-
tional wheat from the noisy chaff when risks are ambiguously material; if it
were otherwise, the materiality of such risks would not be ambiguous. It also
has been suggested that mandatory disclosure in general has the effect of gen-
erating vast amounts of noise but very little information. See Mahoney, supra
note 175, at 742 ("Although the mandatory disclosure system may produce lit-
tle or no information, it produces noise in mind-boggling quantities.").
182. Hazen, supra note 93, at 157. When the amount of noise trading in-
creases, markets become increasingly liquid. Black, supra note 173, at 532.
Increasing liquidity to the point it becomes excessive effectively promotes
short-term speculation and volatility. See Mahoney, supra note 175, at 728
(summarizing an argument made by Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P.
Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Se-
curities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 268 (1989)).
183. See Summers & Summers, supra note 182, at 269 (noting that "fre-
quent trading is the essence of' short-term speculative trading strategies that
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the temporal conflict.'8 4 Moreover, short-term investment focus
may cause other undesirable consequences.18 5
For these reasons, a bright-line rule erring on the side of
disclosure where there is disclosure ambiguity would be costly,
could lead to market inefficiency, and may even exacerbate the
temporal conflict.
In contrast, a bright-line rule requiring management not to
disclose when in doubt would neutrally affect the value of cur-
rent investors' securities other than triggering a one-time tran-
sitional price adjustment. 8 6 Although this rule marginally
might increase risk for future investors due to the possibility
that an undisclosed risk later turns out to be material, those
investors presumably would discount for this increased risk.
8 7
increase volatility and that depend upon excess liquidity for their viability).
184. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing the tempo-
ral conflict as an even more urgent problem because of the increase in the
turnover rate of securities held by investors).
185. Short-term investment focus may negatively affect the economy itself:
Short-termism as the driving force of investing is, however, highly de-
structive. .... Short-term investing pressures managers to engage in
short-term management, damaging the future prospects of the corpo-
ration with promiscuous layoffs, inadequate funding for research and
development, environmental pollution and substandard production
quality. Short-term investing drives managers to manage earnings,
not business. Only by managing earnings can most corporations con-
sistently satisfy a short-term market's demand for constantly increas-
ing stock prices. Also, managing earnings instead of businesses in re-
sponse to the short-term pressures of the market ... leads managers
to mislead investors, sometimes, as we have recently seen, crossing
over the line into gross illegality.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corpo-
rate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1209-10 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
Other commentators have expressed similar concerns. See Hazen, supra note
93, at 179 (noting that many commentators "have suggested that corporate
managers' obsession with short-term shareholder wealth maximization has, in
many cases, diverted their attention away from the efficient operation of their
companies"); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corpo-
rate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
187, 210 (1991) (arguing that "[t]he focus on the short term has come at the
expense of the long-term planning, investment and business development of
the corporation," and that "corporations have sacrificed research and develop-
ment expenses, capital expenditures, market development, and new business
ventures, simply because they promise to pay off only in the long term").
186. See supra note 14 (observing that although disclosure of an ambiguous
risk could alert current investors to the possibility of opting out of their in-
vestment based on the risk disclosed, most of those investors would not benefit
since the disclosure would reduce the sales price (i.e., value) of their securi-
ties). Erring against disclosure, however, may trigger a one-time transitional
market adjustment in prices reflecting the discount next discussed.
187. This so-called "lemons" discount arises wherever a purchaser (in our
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Any such discount should be minimal, since it reflects only
marginally increased risk, and also would result in only a one-
time transitional market-price adjustment since, after initial
price adjustment, the discount would be embedded in both the
purchase and sale price of the securities. Future investors also
would benefit from this rule as to risks first arising after they
become current investors. Additionally, the rule would reduce
at least the perception, if not the reality, of agency costs for
those members of management tempted to err against disclo-
sure absent the rule.188 Although some agency cost would re-
main to the extent managers may be tempted, at the margin, to
decide that a given disclosure decision is ambiguous to avoid
disclosing, 8 9 ex post review and punishment could limit most
abuse. 190 How the rule would affect the market for securities
ultimately is an empirical question. Some investors, for exam-
ple, might try to find alternative markets that offer more in-
formation about ambiguous risks. However, even those inves-
tors may be deterred by the cost of assessing those risks.
Furthermore, as described in the prior paragraph, investors
may well prefer to invest in markets with lower perceived risks.
case, investor) has less information about what is being purchased than the
seller (in our case, issuer). See Akerlof, supra note 128, at 488-89.
188. See supra text accompanying note 29 (arguing that agency costs may
bias disclosure prepared by a firm's management and internal counsel, with-
out independent professional gatekeepers).
189. Cf. supra note 163 and accompanying text (observing that a bright-
line rule cannot eliminate uncertainty). This temptation might arise, for ex-
ample, where disclosure of a risk would negatively impact management's com-
pensation, such as where compensation is strongly tied to share price.
190. The existence of a disclosure ambiguity is objectively determinable
and should be subject to ex post review by a regulator or a court. If that review
treats management's finding of a disclosure ambiguity as a presumptively con-
flicted decision, to which no deference is due-as opposed to treating it as
business judgment, to which considerable deference is due-agency costs
would be greatly mitigated. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney,
Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy
in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1199
(1999) (linking managerial discretion with agency costs); Robert Dean Ellis,
Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 399, 402 (1998) (linking the "problem[ ] of managerial discretion" with
agency costs); Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A
Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 42 (2002) (referring to "the potential for
agency costs" in a takeover context as "the reason for restraining [manage-
ment's] discretion"); Larry Lang et al., Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the
Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 4654, 1994) (linking agency costs with managerial discre-
tion in use of funds from asset sales).
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A bright-line rule requiring management not to disclose
when in doubt therefore appears to be the lower-cost, and thus
preferred, strategy. Accordingly, I next compare that rule to the
existing disclosure regime, by examining whether cost reduc-
tions generated from that rule's reduction of uncertainty exceed
any increased costs imposed by the rule itself.
This bright-line rule-erring against disclosure in cases of
disclosure ambiguity-should generate significant cost reduc-
tions. Because existing disclosure strategies assume the disclo-
sure decision is ascertainable ex ante with enough care, 191
management must make exquisite and nuanced decisions, often
requiring the help of highly paid professionals. 192 If manage-
ment decides incorrectly, there can be significant liability. 193
That potential liability, and the need to insure against it, im-
poses further costs. A bright-line rule erring against disclosure
in cases of disclosure ambiguity would greatly reduce these
costs because it would make disclosure decisions simpler and
more straightforward while simultaneously reducing the
chance of liability.
191. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
192. HAZEN, supra note 142, § 3.2 at 127 (observing that firms often retain
special outside securities counsel to supervise the preparation of their SEC
prospectuses). Since the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(part of which requires executive certification of each annual and quarterly
report), the hiring of outside securities counsel has increased because firm ex-
ecutives are fearful of personal liability. See SWIDLER BERLIN SHEREFF
FRIEDMAN LLP, CORPORATE UPDATE: CEO AND CFO CERTIFICATIONS AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE CONTROLS (2002) (on file with the Minnesota Law
Review) (discussing recommendations for firms attempting to comply with
Sarbanes-Oxley). For some firms, the annual cost of outside securities counsel
exceeds $1 million. Michael Murray, CFOs Say Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance
Presents Challenges, MBA NEWSLINK, Sept. 18, 2003, at http://www.mortgage
bankers.org/cmnewslink/issues/2003/09/18.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
193. In the United States, for example, the firm itself, as issuer of the secu-
rities, is strictly liable for a wrong disclosure decision. HAZEN, supra note 142,
§ 7.4 at 357. Members of management will also be liable unless they can estab-
lish an appropriate due diligence defense. Id. § 7.4[2] at 359. Although that
defense theoretically requires "the highest standard of care," id. § 7.4[2][A][1]
at 359, "the courts have not been able to articulate ... the requisite standard
of care." Id. § 7.4[3] at 366. That inability creates uncertainty and potential
liability. Indeed, one commentator argues that "[t]o a large extent, BarChris
[, the seminal case on this due diligence defense,] may be viewed as treating
'inside' signatories [to a registration statement, required for publicly-issued
equity securities,] in effect as guarantors of the accuracy of the registration
statement." STEINBERG, supra note 16, § 6.04 at 162. Underwriters who help
to sell the securities, and to some extent even professionals involved in the
preparation of the prospectus and other sales materials, also can be liable.
HAZEN, supra note 142, § 7.3[3] at 350.
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This bright-line rule would reduce costs even further by
minimizing the amount of detail in the prospectus, thereby
making it easier to review the prospectus and minimizing in-
vestor confusion. The rule also would minimize opportunity
costs where risks never materialize but their disclosure causes
investors to overreact and not invest. And, of course, the rule
would minimize the temporal conflict and its resulting devalua-
tion of current investors' securities.
Although this bright-line rule would impose costs, they ap-
pear to be modest compared to the rule's cost reductions. One
such cost is that risks as to which there is disclosure ambiguity
will not be disclosed to future investors, thereby exposing those
investors to marginal undisclosed losses. As discussed, how-
ever, future investors should not be harmed because they can
compensate by discounting for this risk. 194 The rule also should
have relatively little impact on the integrity of securities mar-
kets: neither existing disclosure strategies nor the bright-line
rule assures future investors that all risks will be disclosed,
and the difference in disclosure is limited to those risks as to
which there is disclosure ambiguity. 195
194. See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text.
195. Because my proposed bright-line rule pertains to disclosure ambigu-
ity, it would not have materially affected investor losses in Enron. Fraud
and/or investor failure to read footnotes-not disclosure ambiguity-was the
underlying problem in Enron:
[Investors] could have had a heads-up that all was not quite right at
[Enron] long before the bad news broke in October. The source of this
information? The footnotes companies are required to publish with
their financial statements .... Footnotes do not make for easy read-
ing, however, and the numbers are often difficult to decipher.
Anne Tergesen, The Fine Print: How to Read Those Key Footnotes, BUS. WK.,
Feb. 4, 2002, at 94, 94-95; see also Testimony of Frank Partnoy, supra note 33
(observing that an argument can be made "that Enron satisfied its disclosure
obligations" even though "the result of Enron's method of disclosure was that
investors did not get a clear picture of the firm's finances"). This neutral effect
does not undermine this Article's argument, which is comparative-namely,
that the bright-line rule is not costless, merely less costly than the existing
disclosure regime. The occasional "Enron" may well be a cost of any system.
Nonetheless, the bright-line rule might have mitigated losses by making po-
tential Enron investors, knowing they are not receiving all information, more
skeptical. And, to the extent Enron resulted from investor failure to read foot-
notes, it is less likely to be repeated. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitiza-
tion Post-Enron, 25 CARDoZO L. REV. 1539, 1556 n.87 (2004) ("Post-Enron, no
reasonable investor can claim ignorance of financial statement footnotes; in-
vestors have been widely educated to carefully review those footnotes as part
of their investment or credit decisions.").
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On balance, therefore, a bright-line rule erring on the side
of not disclosing appears to manage disclosure ambiguity at
lowest overall cost to current and future investors, issuers, and
markets, and thus best resolves the temporal conflict.
This rule, moreover, may have significance beyond the
temporal conflict. A bright-line rule erring against disclosure in
cases of ambiguity can help to resolve the ongoing broader de-
bate over how to minimize the ambiguity of disclosure in secu-
rities law generally. 196 Such ambiguity is regarded as a major
flaw in the existing securities disclosure regime. 197 Although a
196. Several commentators have offered recommendations for minimizing
disclosure ambiguity. See Heminway, supra note 11, at 1191-1211 (proposing
materiality guidance designed to reduce disclosure ambiguity in insider trad-
ing context); see also id. at 1155 n.83 (citing COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF
SEC., AM. BAR Assoc. SECTION OF Bus. LAW, REPORT ON REGULATION FD
(2002), at 4-5, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL41000O/reports/
20020206000000.pdf (suggesting approaches intended to reduce disclosure
ambiguity in Regulation FD context)); Wally Suphap, Getting it Right Versus
Getting it Quick: The Quality-Timeliness Tradeoff in Corporate Disclosure,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 661, 710 (suggesting that "[iun order to alleviate the
ambiguities inherent in materiality judgments, the SEC could consider adopt-
ing bright line standards with well-defined and objective triggering events")
(footnote omitted); Shannon M. Mudd, Note, The Missing Piece of the Mosaic:
Improving Regulation FD, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 971, 992-95 (2002) (proposing
replacement of current materiality standard in Regulation FD context).
Heminway notes, however, that "[a]ttempts to more clearly define materiality
for various federal securities law purposes ... have failed." Heminway, supra
note 11, at 1153; see also Wander, supra note 164, at 218 (stating that in a
Regulation FD context, "[i]f the SEC did provide more guidance on materiality,
I fear it would only enlarge materiality and cause more confusion and uncer-
tainty").
197. See Heminway, supra note 11, at 1139-40 (arguing that "the current
legal standard [governing materiality] is inadequate for transaction planning
and judicial decision-making," and suggesting that it facilitates "allegations
that there has been a failure of adequate disclosure, even with thoughtful ad-
vance planning"). Heminway further argues that "[t]he high degree of impreci-
sion inherent in this [materiality] standard not only creates legal uncertainty
and headaches (sometimes nightmares) for transaction planners, litigants, en-
forcement agencies, and courts, but also is inessential to (and potentially dis-
tracts from) achievement of the basic policy goals underlying" various aspects
of securities regulation. Id. at 1140. Regulation FD in particular has brought
urgency to the problem of ambiguous materiality, though in this context mate-
riality determines not what must be disclosed but rather what must not be se-
lectively disclosed. See id. at 1139 n.28 (quoting Jason Michael Craft, What's
All the Commotion?: An Examination of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's Regulation FD, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 119, 156 (2001) (stating that "[o]ne
of the largest failures of Regulation FD is the SEC's lack of any meaningful
guidance or direction as to what information will ... be considered material"));
see also Mudd, supra note 196, at 986 (observing that "[s]ince the adoption of
Regulation FD, commentators most frequently criticize the vague materiality
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complete discussion of that debate is beyond this Article's
scope, nothing in this Article would prevent the proposed
bright-line rule from being applied to all disclosure ambiguities
to reduce uncertainty. Indeed, that broad application is implic-
itly assumed since the temporal conflict can arise in the context
of any disclosure ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
Described as a "fundamental problem in legal theory,"198
the temporal conflict-the anomaly that disclosure of ambigu-
ous risks harms a firm's current investors, whereas failure to
disclose these risks may harm the firm's future investors-can
arise wherever there is disclosure ambiguity. 199 This conflict
causes corporate actions that are viewed ex ante as proper
sometimes to be judged ex post as wrongful, exposes financial
institutions to possible liability, undermines the credibility of
credit rating agencies, and misleads investors. As the world
shrinks through global investment and information exchange,
markets that have managed the temporal conflict will become
increasingly competitive and valued by investors.
There are, however, few relevant legal precedents or au-
thorities discussing the temporal conflict, and none that pro-
vides a conceptual basis for analysis. 200 This Article therefore
engages in a fundamental inquiry, examining the temporal con-
flict as a problem of asymmetric information but finding that
traditional law and economic solutions are inadequate. 201 The
Article then seeks second-best solutions, concluding that a pro-
cedural bright-line rule-erring against disclosure in cases of
standard").
198. Hu, supra note 4, at 1302.
199. See supra note 41 (discussing how temporal conflicts could arise in the
contexts of automobile recalls, safety alerts, and college rankings).
200. The apparent mystery of why there are so few precedents may be ex-
plained by the fact that historically low turnover levels in holdings of securi-
ties muted the conflict's significance; only in recent years, with financial inno-
vation dramatically increasing turnover levels, has the temporal conflict
become an urgent and important problem. See supra notes 89-91 and accom-
panying text.
201. These solutions are inadequate because maximizing disclosure of risks
does not always reduce, but sometimes actually increases, asymmetric infor-
mation. This is because investors are not always rational assessors of informa-
tion; they may well overestimate the likelihood and impact of disclosed poten-
tial risks, just like people generally overestimate their susceptibility to
recently-heard risks like airplane crashes and illnesses. This overestimation
itself creates an information asymmetry.
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ambiguity-would help resolve the temporal conflict and also
would be less costly to investors, issuers, and markets than ex-
isting disclosure strategies. Because this rule derives from a
normative analysis, and nothing in that analysis turns on U.S.
law,202 the rule should have applicability not only in the United
States but also in foreign legal systems.
In deriving this rule, I recognize that a procedural bright-
line rule erring against disclosure in cases of ambiguity would
reduce uncertainty, whether or not there is a temporal conflict.
Application of the rule to all disclosure ambiguities, which is
implicitly assumed in this Article, therefore could help resolve
the broader debate over how to minimize the ambiguity of dis-
closure in securities law.
One nonetheless might question the political viability of a
procedural bright-line rule erring against disclosure. After all,
such a rule runs counter to the momentum of securities law de-
velopment worldwide, which has moved towards increasing dis-
closure. 203 The response, of course, is that this bright-line rule
202. Although I assume a "materiality" standard for disclosure, as under
U.S. law, most foreign legal systems follow the same or a similar disclosure
standard. See, e.g., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS (IOSCO) TECHNICAL COMM.,
PRINCIPLES FOR ONGOING DISCLOSURE AND MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT
REPORTING BY LISTED ENTITIES 3 (Oct. 2002), http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD132.pdf (reporting that "[iun spite of the different [disclosure]
approaches used, most jurisdictions agree that listed entities should have an
ongoing obligation to disclose information that would be material to an inves-
tor's investment decision and that is necessary for full and fair disclosure");
IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROSS-BORDER
OFFERINGS AND INITIAL LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS 11-2-11-9 (Sept. 1998),
http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf (showing materiality stan-
dards used in 1998 by Australia, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan,
Mexico, Ontario, Quebec, Switzerland, and the United States); Simon Wong,
Materiality and Timeliness, Address Before the Second Meeting of the Eura-
sian Corporate Governance Roundtable 2 (June 7, 2001), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd160/14/2353282.pdf (observing that "many countries utilize the con-
cept of materiality to determine the minimum amount of information that
must be disclosed by a company"). Different nations, however, may judge "ma-
teriality" in slightly different ways. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trad-
ing Regulation-A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT'L LAW. 153, 163 (2003) (ob-
serving that, at least in the insider-trading context, "the U.S. standard [of
materiality], analyzing whether the affected information would assume sig-
nificance to the mythical 'reasonable' person in making her investment deci-
sion, has not been accepted with frequency elsewhere," and noting that the
predominant alternative considers "the information's impact on the market
price of the affected security").
203. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., U.K. LISTING AUTH. SOURCEBOOK OF
RULES & GUIDANCE Rule 9.1 (2004), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/chapt09-
3.pdf (imposing a duty on listed firms to disclose immediately information
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only would apply in cases of disclosure ambiguity,204 where ad-
ditional disclosure does not necessarily increase but, as ex-
plained, may well decrease transparency.20 5 At the same time,
the rule would make local securities markets more competitive
with reputable foreign markets that have lower perceived
risks.2°6 As a practical matter, moreover, the rule should be
easy to implement because it "preserves the existing legal
analysis [for disclosure, i.e., materiality,] but at the same time
presents better guidelines for transactional lawyers."207
likely to have an impact on the share price). The Financial Services Authority
is an independent nongovernmental body given statutory powers by the U.K.'s
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., WHO WE
ARE, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ukla/1listinginfo4.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2005). For more information regarding the international trend toward increas-
ing disclosure, see AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, HEARD IT ON THE
GRAPEVINE 13 (1999), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsfILookupByFile
Name/analysts briefings.pdf/$file/analysts briefings.pdf (proposing as a "guid-
ing principle [that] if there is any doubt about whether particular information
is material, the safest course of action is to make a public announcement
through the stock exchange"); CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS,
NATIONAL POLICY 51-201 DISCLOSURE STANDARDS (2002), http://www.cvmq
.com/en/initie/pdf/51-201ang.pdf (recommending, as a "guiding principle, [that]
if there is any doubt about whether particular information is material, we en-
courage companies to err on the side of materiality and release information
publicly"); Martha Mahan Haines, Disclosure in the Municipal Market: Fun-
damental Concepts for Issuers, Address Before the Michigan Municipal Fi-
nance Officers Association (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/spch400.htm (advising, in cases of disclosure ambiguity, that "[i]f safety is
your concern, when in doubt, disclose"); Richard Williams, FSA's Disclosure
Regime for Listed Companies, Presentation to Public Relations Firms (Jan. 25,
2002), http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs/speeches/sp90.html (urging "companies to
consult with their advisers whenever they are uncertain, and to err on the side
of caution if there is any residual doubt about the need to issue an announce-
ment"). But cf. supra note 12 (noting that, according to Professors Langevoort
and Paredes, MD&A disclosure requirements under U.S. securities law dis-
courage excessive disclosure).
204. This point-that the proposed bright-line rule would apply only in
cases of disclosure ambiguity-cannot be over emphasized. One highly sophis-
ticated reviewer of this Article, who will remain unnamed, in detailed and oth-
erwise thoughtful comments (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) ob-
served an intended contradiction of my choice of bright-line rule: "It seems
that disclosure is generally the way to go. .. for issuers who have no ambigu-
ous risks to disclose." My proposed bright-line rule, however, reaches that pre-
cise result because it assumes, as under current law, that all unambiguous
risks will be disclosed.
205. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
207. E-mail from Thomas Lee Hazen to the author, supra note 11, at 2; see
also James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021,
1046, 1048 (1989) (quoting Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer Af-
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firmative Disclosure Obligations-An Analytical Framework for Merger Nego-
tiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 929 (1987) (ob-
serving that the existing legal analysis for disclosure "creates difficult counsel-
ing situations and liability concerns, particularly given that any adjudication
will be determined with hindsight")).
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